The reform of the EU courts (II). Abandoning the management approach by doubling the General Court. Egmont Paper 83, March 2016 by Dehousse, Franklin
THE REFORM OF THE EU COURTS (II)
ABANDONING THE MANAGEMENT APPROACH BY DOUBLING THE GENERAL COURT
EGMONT PAPER 83
THE REFORM OF THE EU COURTS (II)
Abandoning the Management Approach 
by Doubling the General Court
Franklin DEHOUSSE
With the collaboration of Benedetta Marsicola
March 2016
The Egmont Papers are published by Academia Press for Egmont – The Royal Institute for
International Relations. Founded in 1947 by eminent Belgian political leaders, Egmont is an
independent think-tank based in Brussels. Its interdisciplinary research is conducted in a spirit
of total academic freedom. A platform of quality information, a forum for debate and analysis,
a melting pot of ideas in the field of international politics, Egmont’s ambition – through its
publications, seminars and recommendations – is to make a useful contribution to the
decision-making process.

President: Viscount Etienne DAVIGNON
Director-General: Marc OTTE
Series Editor: Prof. Dr. Sven BISCOP 

Egmont – The Royal Institute for International Relations
Address FPS Foreign Affairs, Rue des Petits Carmes 15, 1000 Brussels, Belgium
Phone 00-32-(0)2.223.41.14
Fax 00-32-(0)2.223.41.16
E-mail info@egmontinstitute.be
Website www.egmontinstitute.be
All authors write in a personal capacity.
Lay-out: punctilio.be
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system,
or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording
or otherwise without the permission of the publishers.
In homage to Vlad Constantinesco, Professor at the University of 
Strasbourg, PhD mentor and friend, with whom I had many long talks 
along the Inn about the meaning of separation of powers in 
Occidental systems, and to the late Louis Henkin, Professor at the 
Columbia University, who taught me brilliantly a long time ago 
the emptiness of law without conscience.
Table  of  Contents
Executive Summary  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1. The New Lisbon Treaty Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2. The 2011 Proposal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.1. The Court’s first proposal: 12 new judges in the General Court. . . 13
2.1.1. The March 2011 proposal  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.1.2. The April 2011 Financial Analysis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.1.3. The July 2011 Explanations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.2. The Commission’s opinion (September 2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.2.1. A complete approval of the Court’s proposal. . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.2.2. Need for specialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.2.3. Need to protect stability  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.3. The European Parliament’s complex approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3. The 2013 Compromise: 9 Additional Judges  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.1. The 2012 stalemate  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.2. The compromise proposal of 9 additional judges  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4. The 2014 Proposal: Doubling the Number of GC Judges and Abolishing 
the CST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4.1. The proposal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4.2. The debate in the Council  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
4.2.1. The total primacy of giving each Member State an 
additional judge  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
4.2.2. The inadequacy of the Member States’ budgetary approach 26
4.2.3. Effects of the reform on the Court of Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
4.2.4. Effects of the reform on the General Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
4.2.5. The Council’s first position . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4.3. The substantial role of the European trade unions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
4.4. The debate in the European Parliament . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 341
THE REFORM OF THE EU COURTS (II)4.4.1. The late appearance of the General Court’s opinion. . . . . . 34
4.4.2. Some parliamentary questions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
4.4.3. The parliamentary invitation to some General Court 
members . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4.4.4. The new debate about the reality of the backlog  . . . . . . . . 38
4.4.5. The EP rapporteur’s analysis  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4.4.6. The most contradictory approach of the EP concerning the 
abolition of the CST. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4.5. Some new comments in the media. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4.5.1. On the Court’s proposal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4.5.2. On the Court’s management of the proposal. . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.5.3. On the other EU institutions’ management of the proposal 44
5. The Lessons for Judicial Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
5.1. Lessons from the reduction of the General Court’s backlog. . . . . . 47
5.1.1. The conflict between the Court of Justice and the General 
Court about the true state of the backlog  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
5.1.2. The need to identify the real causes of the reduction in the 
backlog. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
5.1.3. The fundamental benefit of a serious system of 
productivity control  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
5.1.4. The benefit of 9 additional legal secretaries  . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
5.1.5. The benefit of greater stability  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
5.1.6. The benefits of the Art. 255 TFEU advisory panel  . . . . . . . . 53
5.2. Possible additional productivity measures without additional costs 53
5.2.1. Better allocation of personnel between the courts . . . . . . . 53
5.2.2. Dynamic exploitation of the new Rules of procedure . . . . . 54
5.2.3. Evaluation of legal assistants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
5.2.4. Better use of the Registry. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
5.2.5. Possible recourse to judicial fees. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
5.3. Implications of doubling the judges for the management of the 
General Court  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
5.3.1. Why doubling was far from the optimal solution  . . . . . . . . 55
5.3.2. The Court of Justice and the General Court have different 
missions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
5.3.3. The absolute need to clarify the staffing of the General 
Court post 2019. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 582
THE REFORM OF THE EU COURTS (II)5.3.4. The need for a serious reflection about specialization inside 
the General Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
5.3.5. The need for a serious reflection about the attribution of 
cases. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
5.4. A great opportunity lost for judicial management. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
6. Lessons for the Exercise of the Court’s Legislative Power  . . . . . . . . . . . 65
6.1. The need for a global, long term, strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
6.2. The need for greater transparency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
6.3. The need for more formal procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
6.4. The need for a better consultation process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
6.5. The need for a general reflection on the legislative role of the 
Court of Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Annex I
Undated, unsigned and unregistered paper from the Court of Justice sent to 
the European Parliament and the Council  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
Annex II
Comment from Judge G. Berardis for the European Parliament requested by 
the Rapporteur (June 2015) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
Annex III
Press release of the Council secretariat (June 2015)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
Annex IV
Comments on the Council’s press release from Judge A. Collins for the 
European Parliament  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
• The proposal to enlarge the General Court was the first legislative initiative taken
by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in the framework of the
Lisbon Treaty and the first occasion on which the European Parliament partici-
pated in such a procedure. It has wrought a massive change in the entire judicial
system of the EU. It is extremely important to draw the correct institutional
lessons for the future.
• The Court of Justice’s 2014 proposal changed fundamentally the EU courts
system. Doubling the number of members of the General Court and abolishing
the Civil Service Tribunal will have multiple consequences for the process of the
appointment of judges, the geographic basis of their recruitment, the manage-
ment of personnel of the CJEU and the appellate process. These changes make
the absence of impact assessment and wide consultation process more shocking.
• The Member States’ inability to agree on anything but a simple multiplication of
judges made the appointment of judges in specialized courts more difficult, thus
providing an excuse for their abolition, despite such specialized courts providing
a more quality oriented, productive, and economical outcome. It also provoked a
doubling of the General Court which was manifestly excessive.
• The special legislative procedure has been especially long and hard fought, both
within the CJEU and between the CJEU and some members of the European
Parliament. It would be wise to prevent similar circumstances happening in the
future. A reflection should be also opened on the constraints that apply to the
CJEU when it initiates a legislative proposal.
• The position of the Council and the Parliament has sometimes been contradic-
tory. Both institutions sometimes sought to prevent a thorough analysis of the
backlog and the solutions available for its resolution rather than facilitate it.
• This procedure has revealed once again the inability of the Member States to
compromise on appointments in the EU institutions. Their inability is not limited
to judicial appointments (as previously revealed before by the excessive growth
of the Commission, for example). This weakness has become a clear source of
useless spending, and risks now contaminating the EU judicial system.
• Rejecting the use of specialized courts in the EU judicial system is a fundamental
strategic choice. It strengthens the Member States’ role in the appointment of
judges. It also secures for once and for all the principle of equal representation of
the Member States in the EU Courts.
• Rejecting recourse to specialized courts will not help in establishing an EU court
for a truly integrated patent. Whilst patent specialists seek the appointment of
specialized judges this will no longer be a realistic option.5
THE REFORM OF THE EU COURTS (II)• The legislative procedure was not only about increasing the number of judges. It
also concerned the organization of the General Court. The Court of Justice, the
Council, the Parliament and the Commission all pushed strongly for some change
in the system for the attribution of cases to judges in the General Court. This calls
for further reflection to protect the EU courts’ organisational independence.
• This legislative procedure also invites a general reflection on the exceptional
legislative power that has been conferred upon the Court of Justice. One searches
in vain to find an equivalent in the Member States. Supreme Courts do not enjoy
a right of legislative initiative, let alone a quasi-monopoly over it. The events of
the last four years tend to show that serious consideration ought to be given to
the withdrawal of this exorbitant prerogative. Should it be retained, its exercise
should be subject to serious constraints.
• Finally, the doubling of the General Court is an example of a purely mechanical
vision of the management of public service reform. In general, the benefits of
such an approach are strongly overestimated and its costs strongly underesti-
mated. This has created the paradoxical situation where national judicial systems
are subject to budgetary cuts and demands for higher productivity whilst the EU
judicial system is supplied with huge additional resources without any clear vision
as to how they might be put to good use. Such an approach is not to be recom-
mended for the future.6
INTRODUCTION
The Lisbon Treaty introduced numerous changes in the constitutional status of the
judicial arm of the European Union. In 2011, the Court of Justice launched its first
legislative initiative in this framework. The initiation of this procedure was thus
something novel. As it has turned out, it has contained many surprises for both those
involved and those observing it.
After four and a half years of negotiations, what was adopted at the end had very
little resemblance to what had been proposed at the start. What was presented as
(and arguably was) a change of a technical character metamorphosed into a change
of a constitutional order. Regulation 2015/2422 transformed a judicial system
designed for three layers into one with merely two. The possibility of recourse to
specialized courts envisaged in the Treaty of Lisbon has, for all practical purposes,
been abandoned. Equality of the Member States in the appointment of judges has
become the keystone of the system, the independent appointment process for the
nomination of judges having been abolished. To achieve this, the number of judges
at the General Court is doubled, without providing for any additional personnel
resources and even the possibility that they will be reduced. All this was done
without any substantive analysis of the long term implications for any of the four
institutions involved in the legislative process.
The debate surrounding this legislative proposal, particularly the Court of Justice’s
third proposal in 2014, also provoked a lot of surprises and tensions. They appeared
first between the Court of Justice and the General Court. This conflict concerned
both the substance of the reform and the manner in which it came to be proposed
by the Court of Justice. It drove the institution to what has been described by some
journalists as “the war of the judges”, or “House of Courts”1. The Court was even
compared to the satirical TV show Fawlty Towers, and the Court’s president with the
show’s rather obsessive and clumsy character Basil2.
Tensions also arose between the Court of Justice and the European Parliament. This
has also been described as “a war between the EP rapporteur and the President of
the Court”3. Various MEPs drafted parliamentary questions on the topic, not always
receiving the clearest of replies. Some of the Court of Justice’s judges embarked on
1 Politico, 28 April 2015; C. Schmidt, “House of Courts de soap bij het EU-hof”, Trouw, 3 May 2015.
2 S. Peers, “Don’t mention the extra judges!” When CJEU reform turns into farce”, 3 July 2015. (http://eula-
wanalysis.blogspot.lu/2015/07/dont-mention-extra-judges-when-cjeu.html)
3 Politico, 28 April 2015.
See D. Seytre, “Si tu ne me donnes pas les juges », Le Jeudi, 19 March 2015. This is the only in depth inter-
view which the Rapporteur gave about his approach. The important role of “Le Jeudi” as a source of infor-
mation must be emphasised. Whilst in this debate, journalists notably M. Newman, J. Quatremer and D.
Robinson have brought crucial items of information to public attention, D. Seytre’s chroniques in “Le jeudi”
remain the most regular and detailed source for many items.7
THE REFORM OF THE EU COURTS (II)a lobbying campaign in the European Parliament. In the course of this legislative
process, documents containing information originating in the Court of Justice but
without having any official status were circulated. Many letters were exchanged,
often published in the press.
Contradictions appeared in the Council’s position. Initially doubting the need for any
increase in the number of judges, Member States enthusiastically endorsed a huge
one, just at the time when the need for any increase had become less obvious. The
European Parliament adopted the reform without taking some of the normal precau-
tions in the legislative process, such as the adoption of an impact assessment or
carrying out a serious costs/benefits analysis of the possible solutions offered.
Indeed the main political groups were extremely eager to avoid any serious impact
assessment,4 and the President of the European Parliament seemed keener on accel-
erating the procedure as much as possible. Nor was this constitutional change
brought to the attention of the national parliaments. Finally, a number of legal uncer-
tainties emerged.
Meanwhile, behind the deep fog of these political negotiations, the General Court
implemented important managerial reforms, as this author first recommended in
20115. This progressively led to an impressive rise in the number of cases closed. The
backlog began to diminish in 2014, and diminished drastically in 20156. So did the
length of proceedings7. There are strong reasons to believe that much more cannot
be done8. In any case, the “urgency” which was invoked by all EU institutions and
Member States when they approved the doubling of the General Court in 2015 had
clearly disappeared. As a matter of fact, at the end of 2015 various press articles
indicated that it had become difficult to find work for the existing judges, even prior
to the arrival of 12 of their new 28 colleagues9.
It is difficult to assess the long term implications of all this. There is no precedent in
the history of the EU, since prior to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty there was
no comparable legislative procedure over the EU judicial system. There is also no
precedent in the Member States, since no national supreme court has ever been
4 D. Seytre, La Cour et les socialistes, Le Jeudi, 15 octobre 2015.
5 See F. Dehousse (with M. Rouland), The Reform of the EU Courts: The Need of a Management Approach,
Tepsa, Egmont Paper No. 53, December 2011. To prevent repetitions, many references will be made to the
information provided in this paper, hereafter “The reform of the EU courts I”.
6 The number of applications was 617 in 2012, 790 in 2013, 912 in 2014, and 831 in 2015. The number of
closed cases was 688 in 2012, 702 in 2013, 814 in 2014, and 987 in 2015. Consequently, there was a very
substantial reduction of the backlog and the stock in 2015, thanks to a very limited increase of personnel.
7 For example the average length of proceedings fell from 26,9 months in 2013 to 23,4 months in 2014 and to
20,6 in 2015.
8 As indicated by Judge van der Woude of the General Court, “when considering the length of proceedings, it
should also be borne in mind that it is almost impossible to bring the duration of proceedings to below 24
months due to the length of the written proceedings, procedural measures and translations.” (M. van der
Woude, In favour of effective judicial protection: A reminder of the 1988 objectives, Concurrences, 4/2014,
p. 1).
9 D. Seytre, “Une insulte à l’intelligence”, Le Jeudi, 4 novembre 2015; M. Newman, EU’ General Court sees
‘dramatic drop’ in new case, judge says; Mlex, 30 September 2015.8
THE REFORM OF THE EU COURTS (II)granted the right of legislative initiative, let alone a quasi-monopoly. The progress
and outcome of this debate is thus extremely interesting for the development of
European public law and the operation of the principle of the separation of powers.
It has also brought to light many fundamental aspects of the functioning of the Court
of Justice that were previously unknown. Beyond that, this legislative debate
additionally offers some interesting lessons concerning the whole EU institutional
system, and generally public service reform in times of budgetary constraints.
It is in this perspective that this article seeks to describe the evolution of the Court of
Justice’s legislative proposal, refers to many useful documents that were made
public, and formulates questions for future debate. In a first part, after evoking the
Treaty framework (§ 1), the article examines the three successive proposals made by
the Court of Justice (§ 2 to 4). It will then draw some lessons for judicial (§ 5) and
legislative management (§ 6)10.
Franklin DEHOUSSE
With the collaboration of Benedetta MARSICOLA11
10 In November 2015, the Court of Justice presented a second legislative request to abolish the Civil Service
Tribunal. This proposal will not be covered here. It contains transitory provisions which provide
• continuity in the procedure applicable to civil service litigation for so long as new specific procedural
measures have been adopted. In the event of a case being transferred to the General Court after the oral
part of the procedure has been closed, that part of the procedure will be reopened;
• that the General Court remains competent to hear appeals against the Civil Service Tribunal of which it
has been seized as of 31 August 2016 or which are brought after that date. Where the General Court sets
aside a judgment of the Civil Service Tribunal but is unable to rule on the application, it shall refer the
case to a chamber of the General Court other than that which ruled on the appeal;
• as a consequence, all other appeals should be filed in the Court of Justice.
In addition, it introduces two new provisions in the Statute of the Court. One is of a technical nature and is
required in order to make sure that all EU organs fall within the jurisdiction of the GC insofar as concerns
civil service litigation. The other provides that all provisions as regards the jurisdiction, composition, organ-
ization and procedure of specialized courts should be contained in an annex to the Statute.
11 F. Dehousse is professor (on sabbatical in abeyance) at the University of Liège, and judge at the General
Court. Benedetta Marsicola is legal assistant in the General Court. This article is written in a strictly personal
capacity. Documents are up to date as of 28 February 2016.9
1. THE NEW LISBON TREATY FRAMEWORK
Article 281 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), provides
that the European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary
legislative procedure, may amend the provisions of the Statute of the Court of Justice
(protocol n° 3 to the TFEU)12, with certain exceptions. They may do so at the request
of the Court of Justice and after consultation of the Commission, or on a proposal
from the Commission after consultation of the Court of Justice13.
The Court of Justice already had the capacity to make such a request under Article
245 TEC (Nice Treaty) and Article 188 TEC (Maastricht Treaty). However under those
procedures the Statute of the Court had to be amended under the same rules as
those governing amendments of the Treaties. Thus the European Parliament had no
say and the Member States had to act unanimously. Post Lisbon the European Parlia-
ment is involved in the same way as any other ordinary legislative procedure, and the
Council can act by a qualified majority only. Moreover, under the Nice/Maastricht
procedure, all Member States could submit amendments. Post Lisbon the Court of
Justice and the Commission enjoy a monopoly over the right of initiative.
The Lisbon Treaty also strengthened the three level judicial structure of the
European Union14. The Nice Treaty had evoked the possibility of creating specialized
chambers attached to the General Court. The Lisbon Treaty expressly conceives of
establishing specialized courts. There were many reasons for this step as specialized
courts were regarded as providing greater productivity, lower costs, a more focussed
system for the appointment of judges and greater coherence of the jurisprudence.
These reasons were confirmed by experience. The only specialised court is the Civil
Service Tribunal (CST) instituted in 2004.15 As emphasized by the President of the
Court of Justice in 2010 at the fifth anniversary of the creation of the CST “It therefore
comes as no surprise that today, after it has been in existence for five years and has
disposed of some 500 cases, the report on the Tribunal is a very positive one”.16
12 OJ 2012, C326.
13 The architecture of the EU judicial institution, set in Article 19 of the Treaty on European Union (TUE),
following the very European tradition of confusing names, provides that the Court of Justice of the Euro-
pean Union (CJEU) – the Institution – includes various jurisdictions: the Court of Justice (CJ), the General
Court (GC) and specialised courts.
14 For more comments, see for example J.V. Louis, Le Traité de Lisbonne, JTDE 2007, pp. 289-298; R. Barents,
The Court of Justice after the Treaty of Lisbon, Common Market Law Review 2010, volume 47, issue 3, pp.
709/728; S. Van der Jeught, Le Traité de Lisbonne et la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne, Journal de
droit européen, 2009, n° 164, pp 297-303; D. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, La Cour de justice de
l’Union européenne après le Traité de Lisbonne, Gazette du Palais, 19 juin 2008, n°171, pp. 23 et seq.; A.
Arnull, The European Court of Justice after Lisbon, in The Treaty of Lisbon and the future of European law
and policy. 2012, p. 34-54, K. Lenaerts, Challenges facing the European Court of Justice after the Treaty of
Lisbon, Revista română de drept european. 3 (2010), p. 19-37.
15 Council Decision of 2 November 2004 establishing the European Union Civil Service Tribunal (2004/752/EC,
Euratom), OJ, L 9.11.2004, p.7.
16 The Civil Service Tribunal (CST) 2005 – 2010, Proceedings of the Colloquium organised on the occasion of the 5th
Anniversary of the CST, Luxembourg, 1 October 2010, Human Rights Law Journal, 30 June 2011 Vol. 31 No. 1.11
2. THE 2011 PROPOSAL
2.1. The Court’s first proposal: 12 new judges in the General 
Court
2.1.1. The March 2011 proposal
On 28 March 2011, the Court of Justice submitted to the Council and the Parliament
a set of amendments to the Statute of the Court of Justice.17 They concerned the
three EU courts. They aimed to (a) modify the rules relating to the composition of the
Grand Chamber and to establish the office of Vice-President of the Court of Justice,
(b) provide for the possibility of attaching temporary judges to the specialized courts
in order to substitute those judges that may be absent for a long time; and (c) add 12
new judges to the General Court18. This paper focusses on the proposal to increase
the number of judges of the General Court19.
The explanatory note to the proposal20 described the reasons underlying it. For
several years the number of cases ruled by the GC had been lower than the number
of cases filed. This created a constant rise in the number of pending cases. It had also
led to an increase in the duration of proceedings before the GC, in particular in
certain classes of action which required a considerable amount of factual informa-
tion to be taken into account. This development threatened the right of litigants to
have their cases ruled within a reasonable time, infringing Article 6, paragraph 1 of
the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 47 of the Charter of Funda-
mental Rights. The increase in the GC’s workload was linked to the devolution to it of
jurisdiction over certain classes of actions, to the 2004 and 2007 accessions to the
EU, to the increase in the number and variety of legislative and regulatory acts of the
EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, and to the increase in trademark litiga-
tion. It was considered that the number of applications would increase in the future.
According to the explanatory note, the measures already taken and the creation of
the CST had not enabled the GC to reduce its backlog21. It was thus necessary to
resort to one of the two possibilities offered by the Treaties: either to apply Article
257 TFEU and establish a new specialized court, namely covering intellectual
17 Interinstitutional file 2011/0901 (COD)
18 The legislative procedure which led to the adoption of Regulation 741/2012 is referenced with the interin-
stitutional file number 2011/0901A (COD), while the membership of the General Court procedure is named
2011/0901B (COD).
19 The other proposals, following a split in the legislative procedure, were adopted in Regulation 741/2012,
which also provides for the election of a Vice-president in the Court of Justice and the General Court. (OJ, L
228/1)
20 See Council document 8787/11.
21 The entire legislative procedure has been marked by endless confusion between a backlog of cases and the
stock of cases. On this point, see The reform of the EU courts I, pp. 13-14, and the 2015 controversy
described in § 5.1.1.13
THE REFORM OF THE EU COURTS (II)property matters or to increase the number of judges of the GC, the latter possibility
provided by Article 19 TEU. The Court of Justice considered that the latter solution
was clearly preferable to the former on the grounds of (a) effectiveness, (b) urgency,
(c) flexibility and (d) consistency.
As regards effectiveness, the Court pointed out that eliminating the caseload associ-
ated with trademarks would not alleviate the burden on the GC as the most complex
cases would remain before it. Moreover, the GC would be required to deal with an
increasing number of appeals against the decisions of such a specialized court, not to
mention the possibility of being given jurisdiction to hear preliminary rulings in the
intellectual property field. The Court of Justice affirmed that account should be taken
of the fact that, due to the limited number of judges in a specialized court, the
absence of any of one or more of them would create serious difficulties in its
functioning. It also argued that, in organizational terms, it would be easier to
integrate new judges into an existing structure than to create a new one. Thus
appointing additional judges to the GC would be a faster solution and therefore a
more appropriate response to the urgency of the situation [this in 2011...].
According to the Court of Justice another advantage of its proposed solution was its
flexibility (in terms of the allocation of resources to where they are most needed)
and its reversibility. The Court pointed out that it would be more difficult to
dismantle a new court once it had come into operation [which is what is about to
happen] than to reduce the number of judges by providing that certain posts lapse
upon the expiry of the relevant terms of office [but it seems difficult to reverse a
decision to appoint 2 judges per Member States, unless one returns to 1].
As for the consistency of EU law, the Court of Justice emphasised that any creation
of a specialized trademark court also implied a transfer of the related preliminary
ruling proceedings to the GC as provided by Article 256, paragraph 3, TFEU. However,
such a transfer should only be done in exceptional circumstances; would possibly
have negative repercussions on other areas, such as the law of the internal market,
and would be likely to create confusion in the Member States. Moreover, the Court
of Justice made the point that, were a specialized court to be put in place, trade mark
applications could be subject to six levels of review.
The Court of Justice considered that the GC required 12 new judges. This increase
would enable that court to absorb its backlog and facilitate a reorganization of its
work by giving priority to complex cases and, possibly, by introducing specialized
chambers. The Court provided no further information as to how it reached the
conclusion that 12 judges was the appropriate number.
The Court stressed that it was essential that any increase in the number of judges “be
accompanied at the same time by reflection on how to make the best use of all the
General Court’s resources, perhaps through specialization by certain chambers and
flexible management of case allocation”. Though perhaps unnoticed at the time, the14
THE REFORM OF THE EU COURTS (II)proposal thus argued against specialization between courts but in favour of speciali-
zation within the General Court.
2.1.2. The April 2011 Financial Analysis
One month after the presentation of the proposal, the assessment of the financial
impact of the proposed amendments was presented at the request of the Council.
The net budgetary impact of the addition of 12 judges to the GC was estimated at
13 647 000 euros22.
2.1.3. The July 2011 Explanations
In a letter of 7 July 2011,23 the Court of Justice provided further information
concerning its proposal to increase the number of judges at the General Court. The
letter aimed at answering questions that some of the Member States delegations
had raised concerning the proposed increase24.
The Court pointed out that the creation of a specialized intellectual property court
was not a solution since the cases in this field tended to be adjudicated upon more
easily and quickly, while the major challenge confronting the GC was ruling upon
more complex cases in fields such as competition and state aid. It stated that, even
after the creation of a specialized court, more than a thousand cases would remain
pending before the GC. In addition, the costs of a specialized court would not be
commensurate with those of an increase in the number of judges of the GC, since the
former “would have to be equipped with a sufficient number of Members and staff
for their chambers, as well as a Registry”. It underlined once again that the GC would
still be competent to hear appeals and that this solution would endanger the consist-
ency of intellectual property law, which would henceforth come under the jurisdic-
tion of three different EU courts. It would rather be desirable that a single court, the
Court of Justice, retained jurisdiction to hear appeals and references for preliminary
ruling. Finally, the Court underlined the greater flexibility of its proposed solution as
well as its capacity of it being implemented more quickly.
Lastly, a letter of the Court’s Registrar25 to the Council dated 7 November 2011
provided further information. In particular, it concluded, first, that the number of
22 Doc. 8787/11 ADD 1
23 Doc. 12719/11
24 Working Party on Court of Justice, see: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/preparatory-
bodies/working-party-court-justice/.
The information is presented to be a clarification of the reasons why, “following a lengthy process of reflec-
tion involving the General Court” it was decided that increasing the number of judges would be the best
solution. Simultaneously, however, the Court refused to distribute the General Court’s reflection document
(referenced in note 7 of the proposal) in the Council.
25 Doc. 16904/11.15
THE REFORM OF THE EU COURTS (II)cases filed had continued to rise; second, that the number of cases ruled had risen
considerably, corresponding to 37% increase in productivity;, third, that the number
of pending cases continued to rise, notwithstanding the GC’s best endeavours. In
addition, these figures took no account of applications for expedited procedure and
for interim relief. The letter added that the General Court Registry had received
44000 procedural documents in 2011 and that its file cases occupied 505 linear
meters.
The letter then explained various steps the GC had taken to cope with its caseload.
In particular, it referred to the measures allowing it to rule without an oral procedure
in intellectual property cases and to clarify the role of interveners in such cases, and
to six working and organisational measures, namely: its organisation into eight
chambers of three judges; monitoring of time-limits; the summary nature of Reports
for the Hearing; a broad interpretation of the connection criterion in the allocation
of cases among judges and new methods of drafting judgments and orders. All these
actions, whilst increasing productivity, had proved insufficient.
Concerning the Commission’s suggestion (see § 2.2) regarding the specialisation of
chambers, the letter said that “it has been declared that specialisation of chambers
must not be confused with specialisation of judges”. How it is possible to have
specialized chambers without specialized judges (since chambers consist of judges)
was – and still is – difficult to understand. As seen below, this topic is far more
complex than one might expect (see § 5.5).
2.2. The Commission’s opinion (September 2011)
2.2.1. A complete approval of the Court’s proposal
The Commission adopted its opinion on 30 September 2011.26 It supported the
entirety of the Court’s proposal. So far as the amendments concerning the GC were
concerned, the Commission considered that increasing the number of judges was the
most timely solution, as the creation of a new specialized court would only produce
results after a considerable lapse of time. The Commission pointed out that it was
difficult to foresee the medium term effects of the establishment of a number of
agencies and other developments in secondary legislation. In the light of this an
increase in the number of judges was a more flexible solution.
26 COM (2011) 596 final.16
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The Commission added that it would be necessary to introduce further amendments
to the Statute. In particular, some form of specialization by chamber was imperative
in order to avoid an excessive fragmentation of case law and thus proposed the
creation of at least two specialized chambers.
Here one can observe the beginning of a practice that would, alas, be pursued
throughout this legislative process. A proposal emerges out of the blue, with impor-
tant constitutional and managerial impacts and vital consequences for the appoint-
ment of judges and personnel. It is strongly supported by people who have no direct
experience in the matter, without the benefit of any external consultation, beginning
with the court in question, and without conducting any impact assessment (although
one might have thought the Commission would know better in that domain). The
Commission has relentlessly tried to micromanage some aspects of the General
Court’s organisation. Since the Commission is also by far the most frequent
defendant in cases before the General Court, the content of its legislative positions
in this domain requires very close analysis.
2.2.3. Need to protect stability
The Commission stressed the need to determine arrangements for nominating the
12 judges, which would have to be “swift and non-conflicting” (thus immediately
identifying the most controversial aspect of the proposal). It pointed out the funda-
mental objectives to keep in mind when making these arrangements including: to
ensure the most suitable and qualified candidates are nominated; to guarantee
stability by requiring Member States to renew the mandate of efficient judges and,
last but not least, to ensure fair representation for all national legal systems. Having
admitted that pursuing all of these objectives simultaneously was far from easy when
going from 28 to 40 judges and replacing between 19 and 20 judges every three
years, the Commission suggested two possible models. This was the first time that
the importance of the stability of the General Court was mentioned in the legislative
process.
The first model attempted to ensure equality between Member States and as much
stability as possible. The second model aimed at finding a balance between the
representation of national systems and specialization by subject matter. To this end,
half of the new judges would be selected taking account of their specialization in
certain matters. Both systems were, unsurprisingly, rather complex.17
THE REFORM OF THE EU COURTS (II)2.3. The European Parliament’s complex approach
The Presidency gave mandate to the Coreper to initiate negotiations with the
European Parliament on the reform proposal on 7 May 2012. The legislative proce-
dure was divided in two parts in order to progress those elements unconnected with
the composition of the General Court27.
On 5 March 2013 the European Parliament presented its Draft Report28 on the 2011/
0901/B(COD) procedure, the rapporteur being Mrs Alexandra Thein. The vote in the
Legal Affairs Committee took place on 20 June 2013. The rapporteur handed in her
report to the Plenary on 10 July 2013.29 It provided that the General Court should
consist of one Judge per Member State to which 12 additional judges were to be
added, appointed regardless of nationality and exclusively by reference to their
professional and personal suitability, with the condition that there would be no more
than two judges per Member State. The amendments to the Statute tabled in the
Report provided that all Member States might submit nominations and that retiring
judges could also be candidates. It provided that the panel referred to in Article 255
TFEU should evaluate the candidates and shortlist at least twice as many of the
number of Judges to be appointed by common accord of the Member States.
On 12 December 2013 the plenary adopted at first reading the amendments to the
proposal as drafted in the Report. However, Mrs Thein proposed that the vote on the
draft legislative resolution be postponed in accordance with Rule 57(2) of the EP
Rules of procedure,30 which applies when the Council substantially modifies the
proposal for a legislative act. As she explained, she made such a move following a
request from the Greek Presidency.31 As the EP agreed on the postponement, the
matter was deemed to have been referred back to the committee responsible for
reconsideration.32
The longed-for first reading agreement between the Parliament and the Council did
not take place.33 Therefore, on 15 April 2014, the Parliament finally voted its legisla-
tive resolution at first reading.34 It adopted as its position at first reading the text
adopted on 12 December 2013.
27 The Committee on legal affairs of the European Parliament presented its draft report on the fast-going part
of the legislative procedure [(2011/0901A (COD)] on 29 November 2011 (PE475.771). The report was tabled
for plenary on 5 June 2012; the rapporteur was Alexandra Thein (ALDE). (A7-0185/2012). The Parliament
adopted its first/single reading on the first part of the proposed amendments on 5 July 2012 (P_
TA(2012)0294). As mentioned above, Regulation 741/2012 was adopted on 11 August 2012.
28 PR\925895EN.doc
29 P7_TA-PROV(2013)0581
30 Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sipade/rulesleg8/Rulesleg8.EN.pdf.
31 Explanation (DE) available in EP website: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=CRE&
reference=20131212&secondRef=ITEM-012-01&language=EN&ring=A7-2013-0252.
32 See the Minutes of the meeting: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=PV&reference=
20131212&secondRef=ITEM-012-01&language=EN.
33 Doc. 8509/14 (Information note).
34 P7_TA-PROV(2014)0358.18
3. THE 2013 COMPROMISE: 9 ADDITIONAL 
JUDGES
3.1. The 2012 stalemate
A document of 15 October 2012 prepared by the Cyprus presidency,35 acknowledged
that delegations were unable to agree on the impact of the increase of the number
of Judges by, respectively, 6, 9, 12 or 15 on the backlog of pending cases and the
average duration of proceedings and the budgetary implications of each of these
options. Some of its contents require comment.
Firstly, for the presidency, “it follows from the statistical data submitted by the Court
that there is a growing gap between the number of new cases brought before the
General Court and the number of cases completed” and that “the General Court is
not able to handle the cases within the timeframe set by its internal timetables and
deadlines”. It is pointed out (eventually, the difference between pending cases and
backlog was taken into consideration) that the number of pending cases does not
correspond, as such, to the backlog. The pending cases were said to offer “a
meaningful figure”, but it was not explained how.
Secondly, the document presented calculations that had been made without identi-
fying any precise source. These aimed to provide a rough estimation of the impact of
the increase of the number of Judges on the General Court’s output and on the
average duration of proceedings.
Thirdly, costs were estimated for each of the hypotheses concerning the number of
judges to be appointed. The document states that although the Commission had
requested that the staff of all the institutions be reduced by 5% over a period of five
years, the cost of not taking action on the issue of the General Court’s backlog should
also be taken into account. Delays caused by long proceedings were an obstacle to
undertakings’ efficient strategic planning. Long proceedings adversely affected legal
certainty and, incidentally, the legitimacy of the Union’s judicial institutions. In
addition, the adverse financial consequences of inefficient justice were likely to cost
more than the increase in expenditure. This argument, which the Council’s Legal
Service thereafter repeated relentlessly, may be depicted as an “immaculate
budgetary conception”: the more money you spend, the more money you gain.
35 14916/12, available at http://www.statewatch.org/news/2012/oct/eu-council-reform-ecj-14916-12.pdf.19
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From the end of 2012, some interesting ideas were introduced in the debate. A press
release following the General Affairs Council of 11 December 201236 stated that a
compromise proposed by the Cyprus presidency would involve “appointing an extra
nine judges, with a system of designation based on two parallel systems of rotation.
The six largest Member States would designate four additional judges, each judge
being designated for two successive mandates, while the other Member States
would designate five extra judges, each judge being designated for a single mandate.
Arrangements would be made for phasing-in of judges and for the eventuality of a
seat falling vacant, while the Council would review the issues of efficiency and costs.”
However, the presidency concluded that an agreement on the increase on the
number of judges had not been possible and that it would revive the discussion once
the new Rules of Procedure of the General Court had been adopted (which ultimately
occurred on 4 March 2015, entering into force on 1st July 2015).37
At a public hearing of the Legal Affairs Committee of the EP on 24 April 2013,38 the
Court of Justice’s President Skouris and the EP rapporteur Mrs. Thein, discussed the
reform. The debate’s main theme was the criteria upon which the additional judges
would be appointed. According to the Court’s President, too much emphasis had
been placed on the criterion of nationality. Three key points, in order of importance,
had to be considered. First of all, the criterion of the competence of the candidate,
understood as his knowledge of EU law, of a number of European languages, and his
management skills. Second, the criterion of stability, emphasized by the President as
paramount for the good functioning of the General Court. It was very important that
political reasons would not impede the renewal of a judge’s mandate. It was
notorious that judges need a certain amount of time to become fully operational
once appointed and that they are generally less operational in the last months of
their mandate. The third criterion was geographic balance.
This was an important and innovative presentation. Whereas the concepts of
“stability” and “management” had not appeared once in the 2011 Court’s proposal,
they had evidently gained in importance in the meantime. During the spring 2014
negotiation concerning modalities for the appointment of 9 additional judges, the
Court had devised a clever mechanism to encourage Member States to renew their
nationals by allowing them to keep one of the 9 additional positions when they
renewed the same judge.
36 Doc. 17439/12
37 OJ L 105 of 23.4.2015, p.1
38 See video at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ep-live/fr/committees/video?event=20130424-0900-
COMMITTEE-JURI.20
THE REFORM OF THE EU COURTS (II)The draft general budget of the EU, dated 24 June 2014,39 stated that the discussions
within the European Parliament and the Council indicated that the appointment of
nine additional Judges at the GC was generally agreed, the final decision being
dependent on the arrangements for the appointment and rotation of their judges.
39 See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/budget/data/DB/2015/en/SEC04.pdf.21
4. THE 2014 PROPOSAL: DOUBLING THE NUMBER 
OF GC JUDGES AND ABOLISHING THE CST
4.1. The proposal
On 13 October 2014, the Court of Justice sent a letter to the Council40. It reported
that, according to the Greek Presidency, the Council would not assent to any solution
involving a number of judges less than the number of Member States. It indicated
that the Council had recently encountered substantial difficulties in appointing new
judges to the CST41. It affirmed that the situation of the GC had deteriorated.
In these circumstances, the Court of Justice proposed to increase the number of
judges at the GC to two per Member State, which increase was to be phased in so as
to ensure that it took place in parallel with the increase in the number of new cases.
In addition, the letter proposed that first instance litigation by EU civil servants be
transferred to the GC, thus entailing the dissolution of the CST. It then set down three
stages for its implementation. This first would see an increase in the number of
judges by twelve in 2015; the second, in 2016, by seven, implying the incorporation
of the civil service litigation, with a third stage consisting of the appointment of nine
new judges in 2019.
That part of the letter addressing the reasons comprehends four sections. The first
one bears the title “advantages” and describes the benefits of what is said to be a
genuine reform providing structural and lasting responses to the difficulties42. The
second section concerns the alternative option, provided by the TFEU, of establishing
40 “Response to the invitation from the Italian Presidency of the Council to present new proposals in order to
facilitate the task of securing agreement within the Council on the procedures for increasing the number of
Judges at the General Court”Attached to Council document 14448/1/14, available at: http://
data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-14448-2014-REV-1/en/pdf.
41 As a matter of fact, the Member States had been unable to agree on the candidates proposed by the
appointment committee created by Article 3, paragraph 3 of Annex I to Council Decision of 2 November
2004 (2004/752/EC, Euratom), OJ L 333/7 7 of 9.11.2004, p. 7-11.
42 These advantages were:
• to halt the increase in the number of pending cases by disposing of the same number of cases as the
number of new cases brought
• to clear the backlog of pending cases (the statement is a very good example of the general confusion,
throughout this legislative procedure, between pending cases and backlog. As will be explained later,
they are not at all the same)
• to reduce the length of the proceedings thus delivering judgments within a reasonable time
• to promote consistency of case law
• to increase flexibility in the dealing of cases, namely by a workload-sensitive allocation of judges to the
chambers, or by creating specialized chambers
In addition to these, in some way developed in the earlier discussions, the following additional alleged
advantages of the new proposed structure were identified:
• to simplify the judicial framework of the EU (since there would be no longer 3, but 2 courts)
• to solve the difficulties in the appointment of judges
• to restore to the Court of Justice the power to rule on appeal in civil service cases, making the review
procedure and the ad hoc CST Judges redundant.23
THE REFORM OF THE EU COURTS (II)a specialised court. The document explains why the Court of Justice considers that
this did not constitute a viable alternative. Here too, some arguments are novel43.
Moreover, the document points out that the creation of a plurality of specialised
courts would not mitigate the problem of the representation of the Member States,
as the latter would still not be in full control of the procedure of appointment due to
the role of the committees evaluating the quality of candidates. The importance of
this statement is that it shows clearly that the basis for this new proposal is the will
of the Member States to take back the power to appoint judges. The third section
adds that this solution eliminates the alleged “problem”, specific to the CST of the
need to appoint judges on the basis of merit and not by reference to their geograph-
ical origin. Furthermore, the Member States wanted this to happen soon. It could
have been possible to introduce a progressive (and possibly conditional) addition of
new judges until 2035, as the Lithuanian presidency had proposed in 2013. However
no institution or Member State manifested any interest in this.
At the end of the document one finds an explanation of the estimated costs of the
proposed reform.44 The absence of a detailed exposition of the costs seems to reflect
the difficulty of explaining how such a massive increase in the cabinets’ personnel
would have absolutely no impact upon the horizontal administrative services (as the
trade unions later pointed out).
The status of this letter was not uncontroversial. Some considered it as containing a
new proposal, others a revised one45. What is clear is that it was not presented as
one or the other in 2014. Such an uncertainty is difficult to accept in an EU legislative
procedure, especially one with constitutional consequences. There were also some
observations in the European Parliament that this brand new approach, fundamen-
tally different from that presented in 2011, had never been submitted to the national
43 The arguments against a court specialised in intellectual property matters are repeated (the arguments in
favour are not mentioned). Additionally, the specialised tribunals are presented as having structural weak-
nesses (which mainly consist in the inability of Member States to agree on the repartition of any number of
judges less than 28).
44 According to the Court, the costs of the first stage would amount to EUR 11.6 million in a normal year of
operation, whereas an additional EUR 3.4 million would have to be taken into account in the year of estab-
lishment. Stage two would cost 2.4 million EUR per year plus EUR 1.3 million in installation expenses. The
third stage would add EUR 8.9 million to the Court’s budget in a normal year of operation plus another EUR
2.2 million of installation costs (provided the composition of the GC judges’ chambers is unaltered). In a
normal year of operation, the entire enalegement would thus cost EUR 22.9 million, an increase of 6.6% of
the budget of the CJEU and 0.34% of the entire EU budget. To which a total of EUR 6.9 million of installation
expenses must be added.
45 See for example the UK Parliament’s European Scrutiny Committee of 18 March 2015, available at: http://
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmselect/cmeuleg/219-xxxvi/21916.htm
“The Court of Justice, in response to a request from the Greek Presidency to present new proposals on the
procedures for increasing the number of General Court judges, presented the current document which was
deposited with us on 5 December 2014. It envisages doubling the number of judges at the General Court to
56 in three stages, together with abolishing the Civil Service Tribunal, in order to address its significant
backlog of cases. It also provides for a selection mechanism for those additional judges. This would involve
amending the Statute of the Court of Justice. However, as the Government was expecting a revised
proposal to be circulated, it has not yet submitted an Explanatory Memorandum. In any event, the current
document, as such, does not represent a formal legislative proposal: this has yet to be published.”24
THE REFORM OF THE EU COURTS (II)parliaments. The absence of formality of this special legislative procedure, especially
since it concerns quasi constitutional topics, can only be deprecated.
4.2. The debate in the Council
The Italian Presidency presented, on 28 November 2014, a document called “Reform
of the General Court of the European Union – Possible way forward”46, which in
substance contained the Court’s proposal of 13 October 2014. The new proposal was
discussed by the Working Party on the Court of justice on 7 November 2014 and at a
Coreper lunch on 20 November 2014. It appeared that, while there was substantial
support for the proposal, further work was still needed on the legal guarantees for
putting into place the three stages of the reform, the budgetary implications, and the
effects of the reform on the CJ.
4.2.1. The total primacy of giving each Member State an additional 
judge
A non-public document, dated 8 December 2014, with the more compelling title of
“Reform of the General Court of the European Union – Way forward”47 was
addressed by the Italian presidency to the Coreper. It clearly stated the “it was
impossible to overcome differences as to the method of appointment of additional
Judges”.
On this topic, the documents elaborated by the Legal Service of the Council are
extremely curious. Sometimes, as mentioned here, the Council’s Legal Service
frankly acknowledges that the doubling of the judges is required purely and simply
because of the inability of the Member States to agree on a smaller number. On
other occasions, various other considerations (some completely new) appear, aiming
obviously to provoke the opposite reaction, and to justify the doubling by reference
to objective requirements (while never providing any serious analysis of the evolu-
tion of the backlog since 2011).
A number of delegations had, quite logically, insisted that the three stages be set
down clearly in a legally binding text, which would also clarify the mechanism for the
integration of the CST, and that there should be no more than two judges of the same
nationality at the same time in the CST and the GC. The Presidency responded that
this could be achieved by amending the initial proposal of 28 March 2011. In fact,
there has been absolutely no legislative coordination in the Council between the
46 Doc. 16217/14., available at: http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-16217-2014-INIT/en/pdf
(access to this document was initially restricted).
47 Doc. 16576/14, available at: http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-16576-2014-INIT/en/pdf
(access to this document was initially restricted).25
THE REFORM OF THE EU COURTS (II)increase in the number of the GC judges and the abolition of the CST, though the
topics are evidently connected.
4.2.2. The inadequacy of the Member States’ budgetary approach
As to the budgetary implications of the proposal, the Italian presidency emphasised
the (already mentioned) costs of non-reform. In addition, and very surprisingly, it
stressed that the proposal would henceforth allow for more cases to be adjudicated
upon by chambers of 5 judges or by the Grand Chamber, and for the designation of
judges as Advocates General in some cases, thereby increasing the quality of the
judgments. All of which elements were advanced, again, without carrying out any
impact assessment and without consulting the General Court.
This completely new justification had nothing to do with budgetary considerations.
At the end of 2014, the Member States could easily perceive that the General Court
had eaten into the backlog without the addition of a single additional judge and this
was happening precisely when they were negotiating upon a massive increase in the
size of the General Court for purely political reasons. Thus the search for fresh justi-
fications commenced. Without giving any precise explanation, the reform was now
expected to address very different problems from that of resolving the General
Court’s backlog. Ironically, the first likely consequence of some the measures
mentioned above would be to increase the length of proceedings – in complete
opposition to the reform’s main objective.
Furthermore, during the Coreper discussions the possibility of reducing the size of
cabinets’ staff at the third stage of the reform, thereby implying no additional admin-
istrative cost at that stage, began to gather momentum. In order to respond to the
doubts expressed by some of the Member States delegations as to whether the
proposed increase was the most cost-effective option, the December 2014
document repeated the intention to reduce the number of legal secretaries and
assistants per judge at the third stage, with the aim of reducing the costs by about
25%48. Thus it was not excluded that, without reducing the number of judges (!),
certain adjustments relating to the functioning and the administrative expenditure
of the CJEU would have to be made49. This statement discloses that the exclusive
48 In response to the question raised by some of the delegations on whether a GC of 56 would be necessary in
2019, the presidency explained that it is likely that by that year the total number of new cases brought
before the GC will be approximately 1200. This would justify the number of 56 judges [21,4 new cases per
judge per year (10, 7 per legal secretary if they are two), in 2014 it was 32,5 (10,8 per legal secretary) ].
49 The cost of the reform is presented, confirming that the gross cost of a normal year should be around EUR
22.9 million, with the net costs at EUR 18.5 million, an increase of respectively 6.6% and 6.1% of the annual
budget of the Court. It is affirmed that the proposal is the least costly solution. This is hard to believe since
the Council secretariat has excluded the possibility of simply increasing the legal secretaries or “lawyer
administrators” (exactly what the Court of Justice had done before for itself). Since 2010, this would have
been the most adequate and economical response to the urgency of resorbing the backlog (see The reform
of the EU courts I, p. 19-20).26
THE REFORM OF THE EU COURTS (II)objective pursued by the Member States was to appoint more judges, whatever the
costs and in disregard of the impact of that change on the General Court’s efficiency.
(The equal representation of national legal systems was clearly an alibi since they
proposed simultaneously to abandon it through specialization).
These adjustments, as we will see, risk modifying completely the impact of the
reform. The precise size of the reduction in personnel has remained unexplained
until now (and, here again, was taken without conducting any impact assessment or
consulting the General Court). Whatever about the clarity of the political objective,
there is a remarkable absence of any managerial or administrative logic. A strong
reduction in the number of personnel while simultaneously increasing the number of
judges could have quite negative consequences for productivity, as evidence by the
fact that in 2014 the GC had specifically asked for more personnel, rather than for
more judges, as a matter of priority in order to address its backlog.
Sometime later, the press pointed out that Coreper had reached agreement on this
proposal after the President of the Court of Justice had made a personal visit to
members of the German government. At that time there was a group of 8 Member
States in the Council, led by Germany, which had prepared a declaration to cap the
increase in the number of judges to 12. According to the rules of the Court of Justice,
members who intend to contact official authorities must obtain a preliminary
authorization from its general meeting, the rationale for which does not require
further elaboration. It was reported that the visit of the President of the Court of
Justice, who also happens to be the guardian of judicial deontology, to the German
government had not been authorized in advance, but only after the visit. For
whatever reason, Germany’s position changed soon after that visit50.
A final section dedicated to the costs of a “non-reform” referred to the claims of four
companies that had filed actions for compensation in damages based upon an
alleged violation of the right to have their cases adjudicated upon within a reason-
able time, which amounted to a total of around EUR 23 billion51.
50 All this has been described – and criticized – in detail (with document) by J. Quatremer, La justice
européenne au bord de la crise de nerfs, Les coulisses de Bruxelles, 26 avril 2015. See also D. Seytre, Le
Jeudi, 23 avril 2015.
51 On this, see the comments of Judge Collins of the General Court in the European Parliament on 28 April
2015. It is quite striking that such a childish argument was seriously emphasized in the Council secretariat’s
document. These are mere requests for compensation. A company is free to ask for billions of euros, but
this in no way means that such amounts will be awarded. An idea of the amounts that might be awarded
can be gleaned from the CJEU’s requests for budget credits to cover “inter alia, the fees of lawyers which
the institution must pay in consideration for professional services supplied to it or as reimbursement of
costs which the institution must bear in implementation of a court order, and damages.” [General Budget
of the European Union, section IV, Court of Justice, article 2 3 2 – Legal expenses and damages. (2016, 2015
and 2014 versions respectively)]. These sums amounted to EUR 70 000 in 2016, and EUR 20 000 in both
2015 and 2014. The outturn in 2014 was EUR 14.170,00, and in 2013 EUR 17 343,80. The Council Legal
Service cannot ignore this reality, since it precisely has to deal with such applications against the Council.
Nonetheless, it came back relentlessly with the perspective of a miraculous reform which would pay for
itself and could in fact bring back millions of euros to the EU budget.27
THE REFORM OF THE EU COURTS (II)4.2.3. Effects of the reform on the Court of Justice
On the third aspect, the presidency’s December 2014 document stated that the
Court of Justice would be able to cope with the increasing number of appeals in the
short term and that it could be invited to report on this aspect in 2019 in order to
propose such appropriate measures as may be necessary.
One is suddenly confronted by an important consequence of the reform, which had
not been previously evoked (except, curiously, by the trade unions). The doubling of
the GC’s judges and the suppression of the CST would inevitably lead to a rise in the
number of appeals to the Court of Justice. Asked about this subject in the Council,
the Court’s representatives indicated that it would be necessary to introduce a
filtering mechanism for these appeals. There has been until now no impact assess-
ment of this suggestion, no costs/benefits analysis and no study as to how it might
be done, though it would seem to be an inevitable consequence of the reform, at
least in the longer term. This is an important feature of the EU judicial system. It
could in fact transform the appeal from an instrument serving the interest of the
applicant to an instrument serving only the legal preoccupations of the Court. This is
certainly no minor topic, and it deserves a very serious preliminary study52.
One of the biggest possible problems with the 2014 proposal was that it was never
presented as a systemic reform, though it obviously had that characteristic. The
Court of Justice, as a legislative actor, preferred to rely upon legislative “salami
tactics”. The global design of the proposal had never been thought through, though
many elements were mentioned at some time or other (to mention a few: dissolu-
tion of CST, hostility towards specialized courts, future specialization of the GC, new
system for the attribution of cases in the GC, new regime for appeals, new transfers
of competence from the CJ to the GC, etc.).
4.2.4. Effects of the reform on the General Court
The Italian Presidency’s document of December 2014 largely repeats the justifica-
tions for the proposal already disseminated by the Court of Justice. The proposed
number of new judges was said to be justified by the significant increase of the
number of new cases as compared to the situation in 2011, which led to an increase
in the duration of the proceedings and associated economic costs. There is no indica-
52 This has already been emphasized by Judge van der Woude of the General Court. “It is questionable
whether the Court of Justice has the capacity to ensure a two-fold judicial protection in all of the cases to
which it is confronted. (…) The Court could be forced to prioritise amongst cases and appeals from the
General Court would not necessarily come at the top of its list of priorities.” (M. van der Woude, In favour
of effective judicial protection: A reminder of the 1988 objectives, Concurrences, 4/2014, pp. 3-4). As he
concluded, a strong increase of the General Court’s judges thus creates the risk to weaken effective judicial
protection.28
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of litigation have the potential to increase the number of cases before the GC53.
It was said that the proposal would lead to an improvement in the quality of the case
law. Here again, new justifications suddenly appear. In particular, the reform would
allow for cases to be allocated in a way that takes better account of their importance,
to allocate judges to the different chambers according to the caseload in the
different areas (all this without any kind of reflection about how chambers function
in practice, the requirements of stability and the legal requirement of foreseeability
in the attribution of cases). The new courts structure would also reinforce the coher-
ence of the EU judicial system as there would only be two levels of jurisdiction. In
response to the remarks of some delegations, the Italian Presidency pointed out that
the GC “has provided assurances that it will proceed to a profound review of its
internal organization and its Rules of Procedure and submit appropriate proposals in
time before the final phase of its enlargement in 2019”.
These considerations raise new essential questions. Is it appropriate that the internal
functioning of an EU court is defined in a legislative act? And that it stems from the
initiative of one of the legislative actors? May the criteria for the attribution of cases
to judges be defined by someone outside of the court seized of the cases?
4.2.5. The Council’s first position
The essential elements of the reform as set out in the “Way forward” document were
agreed upon in principle during a Coreper meeting on 11 December 2014.54
However, Belgium and Austria made separate statements55.
On 26 February 2015, the Latvian Presidency sent to the delegations a “four column
document” concerning the amendments to the Statute of the Court.56 The Council
published its (Draft) Position at first reading on 12 June 2015,57 together with a Draft
53 An annex to the document contains some tables and technical information. First, some figures are
presented on the number of case brought, closed and pending at the GC since 2007 – concluding that the
increase in the number of cases closed does not enable the GC to prevent the creation of a new backlog (all
this in a year when precisely the opposite was appearing).
54 Doc. 16706/14, p.35
55 Belgium stated that, in view of the importance of the aim pursued by the reform, it would not oppose it.
Nonetheless, it would not support it either, for it thought there were more suitable means to achieve those
aims. Moreover it would have been appropriate to provide for an evaluation of the then existing needs
before passing to the third stage. Belgium affirmed the right to return to these issues in the light of the posi-
tion taken by the Parliament in the legislative procedure.
Austria said it joined the compromise put forward by the Latvian Presidency which had now gained support,
but, at the same time, expressed its expectation that the General Court will be fully involved in the imple-
mentation of this decision in its capacity as the judicial body primarily affected thereby. It also advocated
finding a solution to the unresolved issue concerning the method of appointment of judges. Austria also
sought an evaluation of the effects of the reform after each of the phases.
56 Doc. 6663/15.
The columns correspond to the initial proposal; the Parliament’s first reading; the agreement reached at
Coreper based on the “Way forward” document; and a final one for comments.
57 Doc. 9375/15.29
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should produce yearly reports and that assessments be made after each stage of the
reform, it being understood that the number of judges would in all events remain at
two per Member State59.
The text of the Regulation to be adopted contained 10 recitals and 3 articles. Two
elements deserve mention. First, there is an express provision to the effect that the
third phase should not entail the appointment of further staff. It is quite bizarre to
find such a provision in a regulation. Second, another provision establishes the
duration of the terms of office of all of the additional judges; those whose mandate
would be shorter – due to the need to replace half of the judges of the GC every three
year – should be decided by drawing lots.
The Council first reading of the text of the reform was voted on 23 June, the UK
voting against and Belgium and the Netherlands abstaining.60 Together with the
statements of Belgium and Germany, a statement of the Court of Justice was added
to the minutes. This statement61 contains a proposal to present yearly figures of the
judicial activity of the GC, including appeals, and to suggest appropriate measures if
necessary, as well as an undertaking to assess the situation after the second and third
stages of the reform. In addition, the Court recalled having invited the GC to submit,
before the swearing-in of the first 12 additional Judges, a proposal concerning the
creation of specialized chambers and to align its internal rules on the allocation of
cases to those of the Court of Justice. The draft first reading position (the text of the
Regulation to be adopted) and the Draft Statement of Reasons were adopted
without amendment.
Simultaneously, the Council secretariat circulated a press release (Annex III). This
elaborated on the arguments previously submitted by its Legal Service. It contained
many inaccuracies about the situation of the General Court, which was presented as
being very worrying, while the latest available data from the General Court revealed
precisely the contrary. This was later demonstrated by a document from Judge
Collins of the General Court, which circulated in the European Parliament (Annex IV).
58 Doc. 9375/15 ADD1.
59 This precision is quite admirable, and reflects again the absolute primacy of doubling the number of judges
whatever happens. So, even if all yearly reports and the phase assessments reflect the absence of any need
to appoint additional judges, they will be appointed in any event.
60 Doc. 10043/15 ADD1.
The Belgian statement was basically the same as that of 11 December 2014. Germany, on its part, while it
welcomed the reforms, said it was concerned to ensure their cost effectiveness and to minimize its signifi-
cant budgetary impact. In particular, it welcomed the Court’s effort to evaluate the GC’s situation after
each stage and the possibility to make related adjustments, and supported the commitment not to appoint
further staff at third stage. Germany also invited the Court of Justice to take all appropriate measures and
to give consideration, inter alia, to the possibility of introducing fees for the proceedings before the EU
Courts.
61 Doc. 10043/1/15 REV 1 ADD 1.30
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Activities that require the deployment of highly qualified personnel necessarily
require that such personnel be properly managed62. This requirement is often not
clearly discerned and acted upon in traditional and hierarchized structures. During
this long debate, the importance of the personnel’s opposition to the reform has
been totally underestimated, when it has not been completely disregarded. In a
rather surprising way, the European trade unions were the first observers to offer
substantial comments about the Court of Justice’s 2014 proposal. They also played
an important role in disseminating detailed information about many topics, begin-
ning with the September 2014 position of the General Court on the future of the EU
judicial system (which until then had never been mentioned or distributed in this
legislative – and even quasi-constitutional – debate). By doing so they strongly
contributed to the transparency of the legislative procedure. The uncertainty
surrounding the fate of the personnel of the cabinets of the General Court intensified
internal conflicts both between the Court of Justice and the General Court, and
between the Court of Justice and the personnel’s representatives.
On 1 December 2014, EPSU/CJ, the Court of Justice section of a trade union of the
European public service, issued a document titled “No to abolishing the CST – Giving
in to a sweeping tide of intergovernmentalism, the Court of Justice is proposing to
abolish the Civil Service Tribunal (CST). EPSU/CJ opposes that: The Institution does
not need more judges, but more staff!”63
For the first time, it was emphasized that the Court of Justice was in fact pushing for
a strongly intergovernmental approach. For EPSU/CJ, contrary to what happens in
the CJ and GC, where the members depend on nominations by the Member States,
the seven judges of the CST are appointed following the assessment of their
individual candidatures. A selection committee draws up a list with twice as many
candidates as the number of judges to be appointed, the choice being ultimately
made by the Council. The document briefly explains that the Council was unable to
agree to appoint a number of additional judges lower than the number of Member
States. Similar difficulties had prevented the Member States from appointing judges
at the CST. EPSU/CJ reproached the CJ for not having criticized the attitude of the
Member States. It pointed out the curious fact that the judicial power “appointed by
the executive power, which will then conveniently hide behind ‘expert opinion’” has
the right of legislative initiative64. EPSU/CJ also refuted the argument that there were
62 The Reform of the EU Courts I, p.18-20.
63 The note was sent to the entire staff of the Court of Justice by email and is available on the EPSU-CJ
website: http://epsu-cj.lu/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/2014-11_TFP_tract_EN.pdf.
64 The note also argued that there was no legal basis for the abolition of the CST, as Article 257 TFUE provides
for the establishment of a specialized court, not for its abolition. This reasoning seems somewhat doubtful,
since both paths are open for the legislative authorities. On the other hand, there is no legal basis for
creating specialized chambers dealing with civil service litigation in the General Court.31
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efficient and economic alternatives.
EPSU/CJ also emphasized the risk to the quality of the existing caselaw of the CST.
According to EPSU/CJ, chambers specialized in civil service litigation that might be
created under the reform would “look like a poor relative” within a jurisdiction
principally engaged with cases touching on economic and financial matters with high
stakes. Moreover GC judges would no longer be appointed by reference to any
specialization in the field of civil service law. As for the fate of appeals before the CJ,
EPSU/CJ pointed out that measures to dispose of these summarily were already
under consideration (increased use of reasoned orders, processing of elements of
appeals by the Research and Documentation Directorate, the possible introduction
of filtering mechanisms)65.
EPSU/CJ concluded that any increase in the number of judges would not help speed
up the course of proceedings were it not accompanied by an increase in the number
of staff in the services, principally translators, an issue that was neglected. Given the
reluctance of the Member States to provide such additional resources, the services
would be faced with a significant increase in workload without a concomitant
increase in human resources.
A revised version of the note was published on the Agora Magazine of March 2015,
number 73, signed by M Sklias, EPSU/CJ President.66 In addition to what is described
above, it emphasised the misinterpretation of Article 257 TFEU, which the President
of the Court of Justice had expressly denounced as “a bad Treaty provision”67. Finally,
it pointed out that the reform would lead to a waste of money and that common
sense would support the opposite solution to that proposed by the CJ: to increase
the number of legal secretaries and staff instead of increasing the number of judges
and reducing their staff or, in the alternative, to create a specialized intellectual
property court. This was the first occasion on which it was affirmed publically that
the Court of Justice had chosen to promote the costliest of the options available.
A Declaration by the Staff Committee68 of the Court of Justice against the reform, of
5 May 2015 (also available on the intranet site of the Staff Committee) added other
elements. It mentioned that the 2004 enlargement had shown that a sharp increase
65 Some elements had already been mentioned in M. van der Woude, In favour of effective judicial protection:
A reminder of the 1988 objectives, Concurrences, 4/2014, p. 4.
66 Available at: http://epsu-cj.lu/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/2015-02_TFP_Agora_EN.pdf.
67 This refers to a testimony given by Judge Azizi in his speech on the occasion of his departure from the
General Court, where he mentioned what had been said by the CJ’s president during a visit in the General
Court. For Judge Azizi, it was problematic to hear such criticism from the first representative of the institu-
tion charged with the Treaty’s correct implementation (see D. Seytre, Le coup d’éclat de Josef Azizi, Le
Jeudi, 16 septembre 2013).
68 The Staff Committee is a collegiate body set up under the Staff Regulations (Article 9) and currently
composed of 13 members elected by the staff of the Court of Justice, with the function of representing the
staff before the institution.32
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that appeals before the Court of Justice would be treated in a rushed fashion through
greater recourse to orders, filtering mechanisms etc. Finally, employing more legal
secretaries and assistants was a more rapid and flexible measure to deal with current
circumstances which could be adapted as required.
The Union Syndicale Fédérale also opposed the reform. It issued a Resolution69 at its
congress in Dubrovnik on 1-3 May 2015. This Resolution put forward a new argument
to the effect that the disproportionate increase in the number of judges, together
with the reduction of the staff of each judge’s chambers, would adversely affect
productivity and waste public funds. The Congress invited the EP to reject the
proposal and to consider adopting the solution proposed by the General Court in the
document “The Future of the Judicial System of the European Union”.
On 9 July 2015 the Union Syndicale Fédérale (USF) addressed a letter70 to the Presi-
dent of the European Parliament, its Legal Affairs Committee and the Presidents of
its Political Groups. It expressed its surprise on learning that, after the Council first
reading position of June, the EP would be asked to express its position in second
reading. This was because there was a huge difference both in quantitative but
particularly in qualitative terms between the first proposal as approved by the EP in
2011 and the one now put before it in 2015. The letter stated that it was perfectly
clear that the 2015 proposal is a new one, thereby necessitating the initiation of a
fresh procedure. USF also found it embarrassing that the Court of Justice had
proposed a reform in the teeth of opposition from the court that was directly
concerned by the proposal.
As to the budgetary implications, the letter stated that the reform would constitute
a waste of public money at a time when the working conditions of the staff of the
institution were being degraded. The Court of Justice required additional staff, to be
shared across the institution in a proportionate and flexible way. (This was the first
time that it was explained that the backlog problem could in fact find its origin in an
inadequate distribution of personnel in the institution.) A rapid increase of the
Judges/staff ratio would create bottlenecks in the various support services, notably
translation. This would give rise to precisely the same difficulties that the reform was
supposedly designed to address: the excessive length of procedures.
69 Available at: http://www.google.be/url?url=http://www.unionsyndicale.eu/index.php/fr/us-federale/tisa/
doc_download/494-resolution-delegations-usf-congres-dubrovnik-2015&rct=j&frm=1&q=&esrc=s&sa=U&
ved=0ahUKEwiM9_CR16HKAhUEaQ8KHUuQBGUQFggfMAI&usg=AFQjCNFwD-6Se_RaYUiJHrcriNeQA-
PYchQ.
70 Available at: http://www.google.be/url?url=http://unionsyndicale.eu/index.php/en/us-federale/reform-of-
the-court-of-justice/doc_download/476-letter-usf-reforrm-cst&rct=j&frm=1&q=&esrc=s&sa=U&ved=
0ahUKEwjGjvrJ2aHKAhXD1A4KHQ4bBNoQFggVMAA&usg=AFQjCNGuGMP1pRjBk7ZhsNZWCdnhzCmZAA.33
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As opposed to 2013, on this occasion the debate in the European Parliament was
much more acrid than it had been in the Council. The stakes involved in the third
proposal were, of course, much greater (adding 28 judges to the GC, abolition of the
CST). The volume of resources required was considerably greater. The proposal’s
constitutional impact was also much more substantial (creating a judicial system of
two layers instead of a three, abandoning the system for the independent appoint-
ment of judges). The new rapporteur, Mr. Marinho e Pinto MEP and the Legal Affairs
Committee began to ask for additional information repeatedly. Progressively, parlia-
mentary questions began to be tabled.
Finally, thanks to the trade unions, it became known in the Parliament (quite late in
the day since until then it had not been indicated in any official document) that the
General Court had adopted a position paper. The President of the General Court and
a number of its judges were invited to provide additional information. This invitation
provoked a huge controversy. Finally, the Court of Justice’s management of the legis-
lative process provoked some innovative (and generally negative) comments in the
media.
4.4.1. The late appearance of the General Court’s opinion
As revealed by the press, in December 2014, the President of the General Court,
Judge M. Jaeger sent a letter to the Italian Presidency of the Council. This letter
stated in terms that, for the General Court, the doubling of its judges was an inappro-
priate solution, and that there were more economical ways to liquidate its backlog.
(“There are more appropriate, more effective and less onerous means by which to
strengthen the General Court and to achieve better and even faster outcome for
litigants.”)71.
The dispatch of this letter provoked a very strong reaction from the President of the
Court of Justice, Judge V. Skouris. In a letter of February 2015, he affirmed that, since
it had not been submitted for his prior authorisation, the transmission by the General
Court of its opinion to the Council violated EU Treaties. “As punishment for their
insubordination, Skouris has hit the judges in the General Court where it hurts: by
reducing their staff. When the final batch of new judges comes in 2019, the General
Court will not get a corresponding number of extra clerks or assistants.”72 Thus it
appears the Court of Justice’s president ratified the budgetary restriction designed
71 D. Robinson, European Court of Justice doubles number of judges, Financial Times, Brussels blog, 12 April
2015.
72 All of these elements of information, together with an informal English translation of the documents, were
contained in a long article by D. Robinson (The 1st rule of the ECJ fight club…is about to be broken, Financial
Times Brussels blog, 27/4/2015).34
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what he perceived as a breach of the rules by the General Court.
This raises many new questions from an institutional perspective. (1°) What is the
legal basis for such a sanction? (2°) Does the simple transmission of a simple opinion
to the legislative authorities violate the Treaties? (3°) What is the institution’s
interest in endorsing a budgetary restriction? (4°) What is the managerial logic of
approving a reduction of personnel without knowing what the workload will be in
2019? (5°) Does it make sense to increase the number of judges and to decrease the
number of their collaborators if the objective of the proposal is to increase produc-
tion? And, finally, (6°) can one defend the imposition of budgetary restrictions
against the personnel in order to sanction an alleged breach of deontological rules
by judges?
4.4.2. Some parliamentary questions
A number of parliamentary questions were asked about the “reform” of the General
Court.
On 6 February 2015, Mr Marinho e Pinto MEP addressed a question to the Council,73
whereby he asked why the Court of Justice had not participated in the CEPEJ
(European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice) study on the efficiency of justice,
pointing out that the Court of Justice had not carried out any cost-cutting impact
study or ex-ante assessment of the budgetary repercussions of its legislative
proposal.
The Council answered that the CEPEJ was established under the auspices of the
Council of Europe, of which the EU is not a member. It stated that the reasons under-
lying the existence of the backlog of pending cases (again perpetuating the confusion
between the two concepts) before the General Court had been analysed in detail,
and the Court of Justice had demonstrated and explained repeatedly to both
branches of the legislature the necessity for an in-depth reform of the General Court.
The Council went on to list the justifications for the proposal.
Mr Marinho e Pinto then addressed a similar question74 to the Commission, in
particular concerning the new part of the proposal entailing the abolition of the CST.
He asked whether that institution had been consulted on this new proposal; if it
could be confirmed that no ex-ante impact study had been carried out as regards its
budgetary and legal consequences; and what was the legal basis for the abolition of
the CST, since Article 257 TFEU provides for the creation, and not the abolition, of
specialized courts.
73 P-002022-15
74 E-004583-1535
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tive proposal, it did not adopt a new opinion. The issue of the ex-ante assessment
should have been addressed to the Court of Justice. Finally, the Commission affirmed
that the legislator is entitled, on the basis of Article 257 TFEU, to amend or repeal the
decision establishing the CST.
On 5 April 2015, Ms. Marie-Christine Boutonnet MEP and Mr. Gilles Lebreton MEP
asked the Council to provide information upon the letter, mentioned at the meeting
of the Committee on Legal Affairs on 23 April 2015, in which the General Court had
expressed to the Italian Presidency of the Council its opposition to the proposed
reform. The Council, after a brief description of the historic background, replied that
on 9 December 2014 the President of Coreper received a letter from the President of
the GC expressing that court’s disagreement with the proposed reform. That letter
was said to have been agreed at the GC’s plenary conference of 8 December 2014,
but there was no indication whether it had been approved by all of the judges
present (curiously the Council’s Legal Service had raised no such concern with regard
to the adoption of the Court’s proposal). Reference was made to that letter, of which
the delegations were already aware, at the Coreper meeting. The Council added that
debates within the institutions are internal questions in the exercise of their compe-
tences. Therefore, the Council acted on the basis of the proposal presented by the
competent institutions according to Article 281 TFEU.
In its answer to a question from Mr. Louis Michel MEP the Commission stated that
Article 257 provides a legal basis to abolish the CST and that it supported the
proposal to increase the number of judges based on the reasons set forth in its 2011
opinion. The Council answered a question from Mr. Jozo Rados MEP that the reasons
for and assessments behind the increase in the number of judges can be found in its
statement of reasons. It added that the cost of each new cabinet at cruising speed
would be roughly EUR 483 000 per year and not EUR 1 000 000.
These questions also raised some technical issues. Was the 2014 letter from the CJEU
to the Council a revised proposal? Or a new proposal? Should national parliaments
been consulted on the doubling of the GC and the abolition of the CST, which had
never been mentioned before 2014? It would be important to settle such matters for
the future.
4.4.3. The parliamentary invitation to some General Court 
members
In April 2015, some members of the General Court were invited by members of the
Legal Affairs Committee of the European Parliament to assist it in collecting informa-
tion on the legislative proposal. The President of the General Court was asked to
comment on the Court’s September 2014 position paper on the future of the EU36
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public comments about alternative reforms. All five were invited to a discussion with
the rapporteurs appointed by the political groups in the Legal Affairs Committee. This
was an unusual format in that it was an official meeting at which the full committee
did not attend but rather the rapporteurs only, which format appears to have been
designed as a result of some form of compromise. This compromise was not,
however, deemed satisfactory by some of the parties involved. As revealed at the
time by the press (which published different letters), this invitation provoked some
strong opposition from inside the Court of Justice.
First, the Court of Justice’s President wrote to the President of the Legal Affairs
Committee to state that any judge, from any court, even one invited by the Parlia-
ment in his/her capacity as an individual expert, had to obtain his prior authorization.
Moreover he was adamantly opposed to the presence of any other judge other than
the President of the General Court75.
Second, after having asked to be heard by the Council in December 2014, the Presi-
dent of the General Court sent a letter to the rapporteur, Mr Marinho e Pinto MEP,
declining his invitation to address the Legal Affairs Committee. He did so because he
had not been invited alone and had not been simultaneously informed that a number
of his colleagues had been invited to attend together with him76.
After the Court of Justice’s President had asked to be invited, while simultaneously
opposing the invitation of other judges, the President of the Legal Affairs Committee
then sent a new invitation to both the President of the Court of justice and the Presi-
dent of the General Court, while leaving in place the invitation to the four other
members of the General Court. For this reason, the Court of Justice’s President
declined to accept this new invitation he had asked for. The President of the General
Court, who had refused the earlier invitation, now decided to accept it. On 28 April
2015, the semi-informal hearing took place77.
75 Mr Skouris insisted only he, and not the European Parliament, could decide who may testify before the
Parliament and that Mr Marinho e Punto’s invitation should be ignored. “I hear however that other people
in other capacities have been asked to attend the meeting as well, this being likely to fundamentally alter
the nature of the meeting. For the moment, I am inclined to consider that your letter supersedes any
previous invitation and that it is for me to suggest the presence, if any, of other Members of the Court of
Justice and the General Court” (Financial Times, 27/4/2015.)
76 Ibid.
77 This meeting has also been covered by EU observer (https://euobserver.com/justice/128508, 29 April
2015).
The four judges invited as individual experts presented a document “Doubling the General Court’s judges:
why progressive, reversible and more economical solutions are far better”. (https://www.idmarch.org).37
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On 17 June 2015, the Council approved its final position. On the same day, the EP
rapporteur sent a press release (see § 4.4.6.). He also distributed widely a bundle of
documents to all CJEU members and personnel. In this bundle were two new
documents which purported to describe the state of the GC’s backlog. The first
purported to emanate from the Court of Justice. However it was undated, unsigned,
unnumbered, and lacked any cover letter. According to this document the backlog
problem was extremely grave (Annex I). The second document, addressing the same
issue, explained that the Court was wide off the mark, that the backlog had been
significantly reduced and that the urgency with which the proposal was being
pursued was no longer justified (Annex II). At the next meeting of the Legal Affairs
Committee, the rapporteur commented that evidently some people were lying in the
course of the legislative procedure. Thanks to the press, the origin of these
documents was ultimately revealed78.
The first of these documents was a completely unpublicized document of the Court
of Justice, which seems to have been distributed in the European Parliament after
the 28 April 2015 hearing. No official information has ever been provided about the
source and status of this document. The second document emanated from Judge
Berardis of the General Court, who had been asked by the rapporteur to provide a
detailed analysis of the contents of the first document. A few weeks later, Judge
Berardis was summonsed to appear before a “code of conduct committee convened
by the President of the Court of Justice”. The precise legal basis of this procedure has
neither been indicated nor established. It was not explained either how the commu-
nication of statistical data in the framework of a legislative procedure, at the request
of an EP rapporteur, could give rise to a deontological problem. The final result of the
procedure has remained unknown79.
78 “Marinho e Pinto sent two documents to all members of the Court of Justice on June 17. The documents,
one of which includes the Court of Justice’s logo but no signature, described how the trend of the past
seven years has seen an “inexorable increase” in the number of pending cases. This document, which
argued for a “structural reform” of the General Court, was sent to Marinho e Pinto. A second document,
drafted by General Court Judge Guido Berardis (at the request of the EP’s rapporteur), took strongly issue
with the court’s presentation of the trends, arguing that the backlog must be distinguished from the court’s
workload. The number of pending cases has remained largely steady in the past five years, rising to 1,293 in
2015 from 1,249 in 2011, the year the court proposed the increase in the number of judges, according to
the document. (President Skouris) has asked the court’s code-of-conduct committee to look into Berardis’s
involvement in the second document, which was sent to Marinho e Pinto following the parliamentarian’s
request for clarifications and the court’s figures. Berardis said in a letter to Skouris that he acted in good
faith and in the interest of clarifying information on the General Court’s activities. In the letter, sent on June
26, he said the court’s description of the General Court’s situation was “very negative” and based on a
“host of inaccuracies.” Marinho a Pinto said he wanted to get to the bottom of these conflicting scenarios.
“The president has said one thing and the judges at the General Court have said another,” he said. “I want
to know if someone is telling lies.” (M. Newman, European Parliament, Court of Justice presidents meet
amid dispute over court overhaul, MLex, 30 June 2015).
79 See M. Newman, EU judge escapes disciplinary procedure following questions over court-revamp plan,
MLex 15 July 2015. “The spokesman said there had been a ‘fruitful exchange’ of views. ‘There is no discipli-
nary procedure for the moment (emphasis added),’ he said.”38
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The rapporteur’s analysis was presented for the first time on 17 June 2015, when the
Council adopted its first reading. He also circulated a press release, which was distrib-
uted in the EU institutions, notably in the CJEU. This provoked a new clash between
the rapporteur and the CJ’s president. President Skouris wrote a secret letter of
complaint about it to the Parliament’s President Schultz, which ultimately appeared
in the press80. According to the press, the Court of Justice’s President even asked for
the dismissal of the rapporteur81.
The rapporteur’s press release was strongly critical of the proposal. More than the
trade unions’ position, it was the first detailed counter-argument against the reasons
given by the Court for its 2014 proposal82. It is thus interesting to make a detailed
comparison between their analyses.
“Since 2013 the productivity of the General Court has increased remarkably
(702 cases closed in 2013 as compared with 814 in 2014). At the same time,
the surge in the number of cases filed in the General Court in 2014 has not
been repeated in 2015. Thus in 2015 the number of cases pending before the
General Court is falling and the average duration of cases before it has been
reduced to less than 2 years. It may be observed that, notwithstanding
requests by me to clarify the point, the CJEU has consistently refused to iden-
tify what is the General Court’s stock of cases (i.e. those that it is working on
or can work on) as distinct from its backlog (those cases that it ought to be
working on but cannot due to want of resources). Nevertheless the backlog
that had built up in the General Court by 2011 appears to have been tackled
and should have substantially disappeared by the end of this year. It must be
pointed out that this improvement has taken place without the addition of a
single additional judge. In any event at present the number of cases filed in all
of the three courts is falling whilst the number of cases decided by these same
courts is increasing.
In the light of these largely uncontested figures, which show that the General
Court is well on the way to managing its caseload in an acceptable manner,
the necessity for adding 28 new judges to the General Court and abolishing the
Civil Service Tribunal (which is acknowledged to have functioned well since its
establishment in 2005 at the instance of the CJEU) must be questioned very
seriously. As such the proposed reform would be a wholly disproportionate
response to such challenges as may confront the General Court, involving as it
does a very considerable increase in annual expenditure at a time for what
continues for many to be one of severe financial crisis.
80 D. Robinson, ECJ Fight Club: EU’s top judge complains about MEP, FT Brussels Blog, 30 June 2015.
81 D. Seytre, Un député content de lui, Le Jeudi, 28 mai 2015.
82 See § 4.1.39
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Court. This absence of urgency should give the legislature and the people it
represents time and space in which to reflect on the nature and structure of a
court system fashioned to meet the needs of EU citizens in the 21st Century.
This is all the more necessary where what is now being proposed is no less than
a radical overhaul of the existing structure as conceived by the Nice Treaty.
Indeed many of the consequences of the current proposal remain to be fully
explained or even disclosed. For instance the CJEU states that the reform is
contingent upon the abolition of the Civil Service Tribunal, yet no details of
that proposal have been put to Parliament. The CJEU has indicated that its
proposal will lead to limitations upon the right to appeal without providing
any detail as to what precisely it has in mind. By way of a press release circu-
lated in late April 2015, the CJEU announced for the first time that the proposal
was now justified by plans to transfer jurisdiction to the General Court, again
without providing any detail. Parliament is thus being left in the dark as to the
how’s and whys of the CJEU’s proposal.
So far as the General Court may require additional resources to address any
perceived difficulties with its performance, experience has shown that
targeted increases of personnel at the level of legal secretaries, registry staff
and in the translation service (the latter which the CJEU’s proposal does not
address, notwithstanding that almost 90% of the General Court’s judgments
must be translated from French), give better results, are cheaper and are
reversible, in contrast to the abolition of a court and the nomination of 28 (far
more expensive) judges. Moreover, absent any assessment of the impact of
this proposal for the operation of the General Court, it is difficult to understand
how doubling the number of judges will not reduce, rather than improve, its
efficacy and productivity.
In reality the CJEU is asking Parliament to make a huge leap in the dark by
adopting what are very costly, radical and irreversible measures without
giving any clear lead as to their consequences. Mere declarations about
increases in the number of cases filed (which is not consistent with the present
trend) or about delays in the duration of proceedings (which have fallen
dramatically) are no substitutes for careful analysis, backed up by facts. This
is all the more since the appointment of 28 new judges and their cabinets –
each costing a €1M per year – in the absence of a clear, objective justification,
is in my opinion no more and no less than a mismanagement of public funds
at a time of economic stringency, which can only damage the image of the
European Union in the eyes of its citizens.”40
THE REFORM OF THE EU COURTS (II)4.4.6. The most contradictory approach of the EP concerning the 
abolition of the CST
The European Parliament was keenly aware of the technical and budgetary advan-
tages of specialized courts. In its resolution of 29 April 2015 on the decision on the
discharge of the Court of Justice’s 2013 budget, it noted that “in 2013, the Civil
Service Tribunal completed 184 cases, as against 121 in 2012 (i.e. an increase of
52%), thus reducing the number of pending cases by 24 (i.e. a decrease of its backlog
by 11%); believes that the elimination of the Civil Service Tribunal is an inadequate
solution to face the Council’s long lasting blockage”83.
Additionally, in its amendments on the Court’s proposal, the Parliament proposed to
re-introduce a number of the features of the appointment process for judges to the
CST into the procedure for appointment to the GC. It nevertheless approved the
proposal without these amendments, thus going completely in the opposite direc-
tion. By so doing it followed the Commission and the Council. In a surprising chorus,
all of the EU institutions and Member States involved emphasised thus the benefits
of specialization while simultaneously abolishing the only specialized EU court…
4.5. Some new comments in the media
From autumn 2014, leaks from various institutions revealed mounting conflicts both
inside and outside the CJEU. They showed opposition between the Court of Justice
and the General Court, between the Court of Justice’s top managers and the
personnel representatives, and between the EP rapporteur and the Court of Justice’s
President. The Court’s 2014 proposal to double the number of General Court judges
was clearly far more controversial than its predecessors.
4.5.1. On the Court’s proposal
Press comments of the Court’s proposal to double the judges of the General Court
were mostly negative, probably influenced in part by the press releases of the EP
Rapporteur84. The 28 April 2014 and 17 June 2015 releases conveyed a clear
message. To be fair, it is not easy to justify a strategy when urgency is not evident
anymore, an impact assessment has not been made, consultations have not taken
place, inflexibility is total, and it involves considerable additional costs.
Typical was D. Hodson’s comment about the measure’s absence of proportionality.
“Doubling the number of judges at a stroke is not the answer during periods of
austerity and financial difficulties of Member States. It is the easy solution but not a
83 OJ L 2015 L 255/118 (§ 8).
84 For a rare positive comment (on the substance, not the process), see S. Peers’s EU Law Analysis blog, 23
November 2014. The title however is very moderately enthusiastic: Politicians 1 – Judicial Architects 0.41
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systems around Europe have had to do in these past few years. It may find that it is
a very good discipline and that out of necessity may well come better arrange-
ments.”85
D. Hodson’s statement is very representative. Since the financial crisis in 2008,
national justice departments in all Member States have been subject to drastic
cutbacks, reductions in personnel and/or salaries by up to 5, 10 or 20%. In such a
context, doubling the membership of a court at the EU level without the strongest of
motives was bound to provoke negative comments, both against the Court of Justice
and possibly against the entire EU system.
4.5.2. On the Court’s management of the proposal
Moreover, the succession of events opened – for the first time in its history – a more
general debate about the management of the Court of Justice. In a long blog article,
J. Quatremer described for the first time the institution’s general management as
quite autocratic. According to him, because of a mix of rules and practices, the presi-
dent of the Court of Justice enjoyed a large degree of unrestrained power. His inter-
ventions in the administrative and legislative fields were almost never contested by
his colleagues in the Court due in part to his wide discretion in the distribution of
judicial cases to judges86. By coincidence almost simultaneously the European Parlia-
ment voiced a similar concern. In a resolution of 29 April 2015, it recommended “that
the institution be reorganised in such a way as to make a clearer separation between
legal and administrative functions, thus bringing the setup more closely in line with
Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights so that judges no longer run
the risk of having to rule on appeals against acts in which their authorities have been
directly involved”87.
85 Available at: http://dev.davidhodson.com/news/how-many-european-judges-does-it-take-to, 7 May 2015.
86 J. Quatremer, La justice européenne au bord de la crise de nerfs, Libération, Coulisses de Bruxelles, 26 avril
2015 (mise à jour 30 avril 2015).
87 The need for a greater separation between functions may also concern the introduction of appeals by the
Court of Justice before itself. After the CJ’s three judgments of 26 November 2013 in Gascogne Sack
Deutschland, (C-40/12 P) Groupe Gascogne (C-58/12 P) and Kendrion (C-50/12 P), applications for compen-
sation of losses allegedly sustained by reason of delays in proceedings before the GC were filed in the GC.
(T-577/14 and T-479/14). The CJ pleaded that the action in T-479/14 was inadmissible since the Commis-
sion, rather than the Court of Justice, ought to have been impleaded as the defendant. By order of 6
January 2015, the GC rejected this plea, holding that the Court of Justice had been correctly impleaded as
defendant. This order was appealed by the CJ in front…of the CJ (C-71/15 P) mainly on the grounds that the
principle of good administration of justice and independence and impartiality required that the Commission
act as defendant. On 30 October 2015 the CJ (as appellant) declared it would withdraw the appeal, which
was struck from the register of the Court of Justice 18 December 2015. It would be preferable, for the sake
of plaintiffs, to formalize the introduction of such an exceptional procedure. The abolition of the appeal role
of the General Court risks increasing this problem.
On this episode, see for example A.P. van der Mei, Court of Justice of the European Union brings an appeal
before the Court of Justice!, 16 April 2015.42
THE REFORM OF THE EU COURTS (II)D. Sarmiento, in a subtle analysis, concluded that the tensions generated by the
proposal were due to the fact that the President of the Court of Justice was trying to
impose a constitutional reform by stealth and through an autocratic process88. He
summarised: “the objection was (and is) not based on the legality of the reform, but
on the means and procedures used, which, I believe, do not reflect the importance
of the measures being taken”89. This was also underlined by A. Alemanno and L.
Pech. For them, “one may deplore the top-down, not to say authoritarian, approach
adopted by the President of the Court, which suggests a deliberate attempt to avoid
any meaningful discussion of reasonable alternative proposals, such as the establish-
ment of specialised courts with jurisdiction to hear and determine direct actions in a
specific area. The Court of Justice’s proposal also marks a shift away from the
principle of specialisation – endorsed by the Masters of the Treaties and set to
materialise into the creation of subsequent specialised chambers, such as in trade-
mark litigation (representing around 1/3 of the General Court’s workload) – towards
a generalist jurisdiction made up of two judges per each Member State.”90
For S. Peers, “there are profound problems with Skouris’ approach. First and
foremost, his response has become the story (it’s also been covered elsewhere). This
diverts attention from the pros and cons of the argument for CJEU reform. (...)
Secondly, Skouris’ angry letters give the impression that the CJEU is an authoritarian
institution91. The CJEU is a public body, in a political system whose legitimacy is
clearly fragile. These attempts to silence dissent surely damage the Court’s authority
more than the dissent itself would. Anyway, they gave that dissent far more publicity
than it would otherwise have had”.
S. Peers’ blog was also the forum for one fascinating development. As Peers narrates,
after the publication of the insightful paper from Alemanno and Pech, the blog
“received an anonymous comment which mixed snide personal comments about
one of those authors with a reasonable counter-argument against their critique (I
don’t know whether or not the commenter is linked to the Court). I didn’t publish
that comment at the time because of the nasty personal comments. After some
thought, I have decided to extract the more reasonable part of those comments and
present them here, so that we can move back to debating the merits.”92 It is telling
88 Despite our differences (accessed 30 June 2015). The post has since disappeared from the blog. Despite
queries and quotes, it has not reappeared.
89 Despite our differences, 15 December 2015.
90 Reform of the EU’s Court System: Why a more accountable – not a larger – Court is the way forward (http:/
/europeanlawblog.eu/?p=2802#sthash.v1k63fro.dpuf 30 June 2015).
91 Peers adds: “Certainly, any ordinary employer would not take kindly to public criticism of its policy by its
staff. For instance, if (entirely hypothetically) I had objections to the management of the University of
Essex, I would not air them in a public forum.” This analogy seems inadequate. General Court judges are not
members of the staff of the Court of Justice, let alone of its President’s staff. Furthermore, the General
Court has jurisdiction to decide applications challenging ... administrative and legislative acts of the Court of
Justice. A hierarchical relationship between the General Court and the Court of Justice, let alone their
respective memberships, is thus unthinkable.
92 “Don’t mention the extra judges!” When CJEU reform turns into farce” (accessed 07.12.2015).43
THE REFORM OF THE EU COURTS (II)that some of the most detailed debate concerning the respective approaches of the
two Courts finally took place following an anonymous comment posted on an
academic blog.
All this had already been very well synthetized by Peter Drucker a long time ago.
Great leaders organize dissent. This is one of the essential differences between
participative management and authoritarian management. “Decisions of the kind
the executive has to make are not made well by acclamation. They are made well
only if based on the clash of conflicting views, the dialogue between different points
of view, the choice between different judgments. The first rule in decision making is
that one does not make a decision unless there is disagreement. (…) A decision
without an alternative is a desperate gambler’s throw, no matter how carefully
thought through it might be. Above all, disagreement is needed to stimulate the
imagination.”93
M. Abenaim described in a detailed way the comparative merits of adding more
judges or more legal secretaries (référendaires). “There was a much easier way out
though: adding 28 référendaires instead of 28 judges. This would have been the
“most cost-effective” approach for two reasons. First, in terms of effectiveness,
référendaires are those whose impact on quantity is the highest because they focus
on the most time-consuming tasks: they prepare the work for their judges, under
their supervision, and judges decide on that basis. Increasing the number of référen-
daires thus appears as the most evident solution to quantitative issues. Second, in
terms of costs, while a whole cabinet costs around EUR 0.82 million per year,
a référendaire costs a bit more than EUR 100.000 per year, i.e., about eight times
less. Increasing the number of référendaires would have also been less disruptive for
the organization of the General Court. This approach would (also) have required no
other transition than the time needed to recruit and appoint the new référendaires,
a matter of a few months without any impact on pending cases. By way of contrast,
the appointment of additional judges requires Member States to propose their
candidates, the Article 255 committee to review their suitability for the function and
then the Council to appoint them … or restart the whole process”94. This was the
author’s conclusion in 2011. Moreover, the management costs of coordinating 56
judges in a court of generalists have been substantially underestimated.
4.5.3. On the other EU institutions’ management of the proposal
Some observers also criticized the Member States’ inability to agree on appoint-
ments to the CST and on judicial appointments generally. This paralysis was also an
important element, and was rightly seen as a symbol of a general inability to manage
93 P. Drucker, Management: Tasks, Responsibilities, Practice, Harper & Row, 1973, p. 111.
94 Follow-Up Note on Another Missed Opportunity for the Administration of Justice Across Europe, 16
December 2014.44
THE REFORM OF THE EU COURTS (II)the institutions in the post-enlargement context. As D. Robinson emphasized, “the
fudge over judicial appointments is another example of the EU’s apparent inability to
adapt its institutions as its membership and responsibilities expand”95.
This is a very valid observation. In fact, parallels can be drawn between what
happened to the General Court and the composition of the European Commission
after the conclusion of the Nice Treaty, where the Member States were unable to
agree on reducing the size of the Commission96. This has led to an obese Commission
of 28 members, in which it is impossible to find enough substantive work for every
member to carry out97. The doubling of the General Court risks now contaminating
the EU judicial system with the same disease.
Moreover, the thirst to make appointments so consumed the Member States that
their inability to agree on the appointment of new judges to the CST since 2014
metamorphosed suddenly into a wish to appoint three new judges in January 2016.
After completely neglecting the interests of the CST by not nominating new members
when it was functioning as a court, the Member States decided to nominate new
judges just when it had effectively ceased to function as a prelude to its dissolution98.
The appointment of new judges and the conferral of new rights on individuals at the
taxpayer’s expense without those individuals being required to exercise any real
judicial activity, seems to be an extravagant means of changing the nationality of the
new judges to be appointed to the General Court during the second phase of the
reform99.
The absence of analysis in depth on the part of all of the institutions in this debate
was also criticized. Obviously, neither the Council nor the Parliament were eager to
deepen their analyses. This was especially the case since the preferences of the
Council and the Court had some quite expensive consequences. For J. Quatremer,
“citizens often wonder how the European Union manages to create complex, costly,
and often illegitimate hot air machines. From this point of view, the reform of the
Court offers a true lesson in how not to do this”100.
The President of the European Parliament also made a number of important inter-
ventions in the process. The presence of no less than four members of his cabinet
during the trilogue in July 2015 was noteworthy. It later emerged that President
95 D. Robinson, European Court of Justice doubles number of judges FT Brussels blog, 12 April 2015.
96 See J.P. Jacqué, Droit institutionnel de l’Union européenne, 7th ed., 2012, pp. 372-376.
97 For a recent illustration, see T. Palmeri, A commissioner’s work habits prompt staff upheaval, Politico, 12
October 2015.
98 See Council Docs. 15454/15 and 15467/15.
A written procedure was opened on 8 March 2016 (Council Doc. 6735/16).
99 This only increases the legal uncertainties surrounding the fate of the judges of the CST who will not have
finished their mandate at the time of its abolition and are not appointed to the GC. Curiously, this question
was not resolved in the proposal to abolish the CST.
100 J. Quatremer, Les coulisses de Bruxelles, “La réforme de la Cour de justice européenne, ou l’art de créer une
usine à gaz”, 7 April 2015 (updated 13 April 2015).45
THE REFORM OF THE EU COURTS (II)Schultz had sent an exceptional letter, on 28 May 2015, to the president of the Legal
Affairs Committee, Mr. Pavel Svoboda MEP, with a view to accelerating the legisla-
tive procedure. The letter very clearly acknowledged that it was unprecedented, and
that it did not purport to create a precedent.
A. Alemanno has additionally identified other abnormal developments in the
proceedings before the European Parliament. “Why was Pinto’s report presented on
15 September to the JURI Committee by a MEP belonging not only to another polit-
ical group but also coming from Luxembourg101 the very country which hosts the
CJEU and stands to benefit most from any additional resources granted to it? What
is the explanation for the absence of any translation of the Explanatory Report (origi-
nally written in Portuguese) on the day Pinto’s draft recommendation and suggested
amendments were to be debated on September 15? Why is the documentation and
correspondence (i.e. ‘Annexes’) mentioned at the very end of the Explanatory Report
still not available? The absence of any translated version of the Annexes is particu-
larly prejudicial to a well-informed parliamentary debate. The MEPs – whose amend-
ments are expected by 23 September – are deprived of the opportunity to consult a
GC document, which, according to the rapporteur, might question the need for the
proposed reform by offering facts and figures contradicting those presented by the
CJEU. When analysed together, the sum of these elements suggests a pattern of
procedural irregularities whose only aim seems to be the speedy adoption of the
reform. More troublingly, it may also be construed as a joint advocacy strategy
designed to systematically eliminate any opportunity for a public, well informed and
evidence-based debate.”102
101 Mrs. Mady Delvaux MEP, of the S&D group.
The same person became later rapporteur of the second proposal, aiming to abolish the CST. As noted by
Alemanno, such a permanence in the legislative debate is noteworthy. As explained by D. Seytre (La
réforme: passera ou pas?, Le Jeudi, 16 juillet 2015), Luxembourg supported most strongly the increase of
judges. One reason had already been mentioned with great enthusiasm by the two EU judges from Luxem-
bourg in 2011: the proposal would represent “hundreds of jobs to be created in Luxembourg” (C. Knoepf-
fler, Toujours plus toujours plus, Le Républicain Lorrain, 3 Avril 2011). The suppression of the CST, the only
specialized court, was additionally a strategic objective, since it would prevent the creation of any special-
ized court outside Luxembourg (especially a trademark court that could have been based in Alicante, near
the European Trademarks Office, something that had already been evoked during the negotiation of the
Nice Treaty in 2000, when the statute of the CJEU was modified).
102 A. Alemanno, “Where do we stand on the reform of the EU’s Court System? On a reform as short-sighted as
the attempts to force through its adoption”, 23 September 2015.46
5. THE LESSONS FOR JUDICIAL MANAGEMENT
In 2011, a basic managerial analysis could already provide much information about
the most appropriate steps required to reform the General Court.103 Between 2011
and 2015, some of the measures recommended by the author were taken and
produced quite impressive results. In that perspective, it is important to assess the
impact of those measures that worked and those that did not. This chapter will
examine the measures that reduced the backlog (5.1.), some additional measures
that could increase productivity (5.2.), and other measures that could be required by
reason of doubling the number of judges (5.3 to 5.6).
5.1. Lessons from the reduction of the General Court’s 
backlog
Curiously, even in 2015, there was no clear vision of the extent of the backlog. This
was not an easy exercise, since the two concerned courts (the Court of Justice,
author of the legislative proposal, and the General Court, object of the proposal)
presented strikingly different analyses (5.1.1 to 5.1.2.). This foggy situation is a
direct consequence of the absence of a serious analysis of the causes of the
backlog, which in 2011 the author had recommended to be carried out. In fact, four
essential changes (at least) contributed to the improvement in the situation: the
introduction of a serious system of productivity control, the addition of 9 legal
secretaries, an improvement in the stability of its composition and the creation of
the advisory panel on the appointment of judges provided for by Article 255 TFEU
(5.1.3. to 5.1.6.).
5.1.1. The conflict between the Court of Justice and the General 
Court about the true state of the backlog
A surprising development during the legislative procedure was the existence of a
deep, and growing, disagreement between the Court of Justice and the General
Court about the true state of the backlog. This is understandable. The Court of Justice
sought to double the number of judges without taking the General Court’s expressed
needs into consideration. It was thus required to prove the necessity for such an
enormous increase. Meanwhile the General Court had adopted strong internal
103 See The Reform of the EU Courts I, part 3.
Unfortunately, there have been very few propositions about a productivity orientated strategy. One,
extremely interesting, was however presented by the President of the Article 255 Committee: see J.M.
Sauvé, L’avenir des tribunaux de l’Union européenne – L’augmentation de la charge de travail: organisation,
désignation et formation des juges, in CCBE, EU courts – Looking forward, 2014, pp. 11-16. Tellingly, some
of the measures he suggested have yet to be taken into consideration.47
THE REFORM OF THE EU COURTS (II)measures and wanted to demonstrate their efficiency. This conflict reached an apex,
as we saw, in May 2015 when the CJ distributed to the other institutions an untitled
and unsigned document purporting to describe the situation in the General Court.
The rapporteur of the Legal Affairs Committee asked Judge Berardis, of the General
Court, to assess the document in his individual capacity. In a nutshell, for the CJ, the
GC’s situation was catastrophic, whilst for the GC judge, it had greatly improved (see
§ 4.5 and Annexes I and II).
This arose from the huge difference in methodology between the two analyses. On
the one hand, the Court took into consideration all possible delays, not only those
during the treatment of the case by the judges of the General Court and their
cabinets. According to the Court, a deadline of two months afforded to the parties
within which to answer questions put by the GC constitutes time taken by the GC to
adjudicate on that case. If the parties request an additional period in which to file a
pleading due to holidays, this delay is also laid at the door of the GC. The GC is also
responsible for the time during which a case is suspended awaiting a judgment of the
Court in a connected case. The time taken to review or translate a draft judgment is
also added to the time taken by the GC to adjudicate on the matter. However, since
neither the judges nor their cabinets can do anything about delays of this nature
(other than systematically refusing to extend time for the parties to submit papers,
or closing cases without reference to judgments of the Court of Justice), increasing
the number of judges is incapable of resolving these problems. As the author already
recommended four years ago104, this shows the need for an in depth analysis of the
cause of the backlog before proposing any measure to liquidate it. Otherwise, there
is a huge risk that resources will be misapplied.
In contrast in his analysis, Judge Berardis examined delays from the perspective of
the workload of the cabinets. He drew the conclusion that judges and their collabo-
rators were working on cases as quickly as they could as a result of which the backlog
was on the point of disappearing and the time taken to deliver judgment was dimin-
ishing.
The CJEU 2014 Report of Activity showed a substantial improvement in the time
taken to adjudicate on cases and the number of cases pending. This improved further
in 2015. As mentioned before, at the end of 2015, the GC had closed nearly 1000
cases, a reduction of 160 pending cases, with a greater reduction in the number of
old cases. It also appeared that the duration of cases determined by judgment had
fallen by 10 months between 2011 and 2015. The GC’s success in this regards is
confirmed by two other considerations. First, no one has ever rebutted Judge
Berardis’ document after May 2015. Second, from that time, all involved institutions
104 The Reform of the EU Courts I, pp. 7-8, 13-14.48
THE REFORM OF THE EU COURTS (II)felt obliged to find new reasons to justify doubling the number of judges at the
General Court, which initiative seems to confirm that the importance of the sole
ground advanced until that time, namely the necessity to reduce the backlog and
shorten the time for ruling on cases, had seriously declined.
On 28 April 2015, for example, the day when the EP was hearing evidence from
some General Court’s judges, a Court of Justice press release stated that the
doubling of the size of the General Court was also justified by future possible trans-
fers of jurisdiction from the Court of Justice. After nearly four years of legislative
debate, this was the first time such a transfer of jurisdiction had been mentioned.
Since then the subject matter, modalities and time scale for such a transfer remain
unknown105. The June 2015 press release of the Council advanced other new
arguments106.
In January 2016, the new President of the Court of Justice, Judge K. Lenaerts,
proffered a new justification. For the first time, the reform’s objectives were
described essentially as to allow the General Court to sit in chambers of five judges
rather than three and to concentrate all appeals at the level of the Court of
Justice107. He referred to those who criticized the reform on the ground that the
General Court’s inputs were greater than its output as “intellectually dishonest”.
However these latest justifications had barely been mentioned at any time by the
Court in its proposals, from 2011 to 2015. Even the latest, unsigned and unnum-
bered, document of May 2015 still insisted on need for reform due to the existence
of a growing backlog that required urgent attention. As for the second purported
justification, as the author already indicated in 2011, it would then have been far
simpler to transfer jurisdiction to hear appeals against the decisions of the CST
from the General Court to the Court of Justice, rather than to double the size of the
former. One can but wonder at the reaction of the European Parliament and the
Council had the proposal to increase and later double the size of the General Court
been justified from 2011 onwards by reference only to the necessity to enlarge the
size of its chambers and to suppress all appeals to the General Court. For the inter-
viewing journalist, “the Court of Justice’s president (whom she presented as the
true author and ideologue of the reform)… is an inconsequent man”, a comment
which in any case reflects at least some of the damage sustained to the Court of
105 Court of Justice Press release No 44/15, 28 April 2015, available at: http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/
docs/application/pdf/2015-04/cp150044en.pdf.
106 See § 4.2.5 and Annex III.
107 Le Jeudi, 27 janvier 2016.49
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In fact, the improvement in the backlog had been reported in the press prior to the
debates in 2015, but no one in the EU institutions seemed to care109. Additionally, it
was reported in various press organs at the end of 2015 that there were not many
cases to be attributed to the first of the 12 additional judges to arrive (without
mentioning the 16 to follow thereafter...)110.
5.1.2. The need to identify the real causes of the reduction in the 
backlog
In fact the very clear (though as yet not complete) improvement of the situation of
the General Court has, as usual, come about as a result of a number of measures:
first, the reduction in size of the report for the hearing, the abolition of the require-
ment to translate all judgments into every EU official language, the possibility of
deciding trademark cases without a hearing, etc. These measures sometimes
reduced the workload and sometimes the duration of the proceedings. In order to
plan for the future, however, it is necessary to ascertain the principal reasons for the
improvement.
108 « Le président de la Cour de justice européenne, Koen Lenaerts, est un homme inconséquent. D’un côté, il
est contre le principe d’une initiative législative donnée à la Cour par le Traité, mais malheureusement, dit-
il, elle existe, il fallait l’appliquer pour entamer la réforme du Tribunal. De l’autre côté, il était aussi contre
l’architecture d’une Cour à trois degrés de juridiction (cour, tribunal et tribunaux spécialisés), elle aussi
prévue par le Traité, mais heureusement, dit-il, elle n’a pas été maintenue dans la réforme, les tribunaux
spécialisés ont disparu. (…) Lorsque, sur l’air de «lui, c’est lui et moi, c’est moi», le président Lenaerts laisse
entendre que, contrairement à l’ex-président Skouris, il n’était pas aux commandes lors des discussions sur
la réforme, il suscite l’incrédulité. Certes, le vice-président de la Cour qu’il était alors a été très discret au
plus fort de la bataille au point de disparaître complètement des débats. Plus personne ne conteste
aujourd’hui qu’il a été «l’idéologue», le concepteur de cette réforme qu’il dit, d’ailleurs, assumer pleine-
ment.
Cette réforme n’a pas fini de susciter des commentaires. (…) Trouble chez ceux pour qui cette réforme a
perdu sa raison initiale – aider le Tribunal à résorber son retard à traiter ses affaires – pour la remplacer par
une autre, moins avouable: permettre aux Etats membres d’accroître leur pouvoir sur le tribunal adminis-
tratif de l’Europe en doublant le nombre de juges. Une «suggestion» du Conseil de l’UE, exécutée de bonne
grâce par la Cour dont les juges sont nommés par les Etats membres ». (D. Seytre, Décryptage, Le Jeudi, 11
février 2016).
109 “The case backlog is exaggerated, according to Politico sources. If true the case for doubling the court’s size
is weakened. While there are 1,423 pending cases, … only 364 are actually gathering dust” (Politico, 28 April
2015).
This was also given some emphasis by J. Quatremer, La réforme de la Cour de justice européenne ou l’art de
créer une usine à gaz, 7 avril 2015. He added that “with a thousand cases filed per year (which is already a
strong overstatement), each judge will have to deal with only 18 cases per year. This is a quite a cool job.”
More precisely, for D. Robinson, “at the start of 2014, extra référendaires – a fancy word for law clerks –
were hired by the court. Perhaps unsurprisingly, this helped halve the time it took to make a preliminary
report, which accounts for about 40 per cent of the time a case takes, according to internal figures. As a
result, the court is currently chomping through the backlog. In 2013, the General Court completed a total of
702 cases. In 2014 – with the extra référendaires – the court finished 814. Since the start of 2015, the court
had received 180 cases, and closed 203” (D. Robinson, The multiplying judges of the ECJ, Financial Times
Brussels blog, 17 April 2015).
110 D. Seytre, “Une insulte à l’intelligence”, Le Jeudi, 4 novembre 2015; M. Newman, EU’ General Court sees
‘dramatic drop’ in new case, judge says; Mlex, 30 September 2015.50
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tivity once it decided to sit in nine chambers rather than in five. Such purely numer-
ical reasoning is doubtful. Before 2007, there were in fact 10 chambers of 3 judges;
each president of chamber presided over 2 chambers. This system was a little more
hierarchical, and aimed at extracting the best advantage of the most experienced
members. This element cannot, of itself, accelerate considerably the treatment of
cases.
Some have strongly emphasized the reduction of the report for the hearing. This did
not amount to a strong reduction of the workload. Arguments must still be analyzed
and synthetized. On the other hand, shortening this document can accelerate the
procedure, since it takes less time to translate. The same can be said for abolishing
the requirement to translate judgments into all languages as judgments can be deliv-
ered without waiting for all such translations. This does not speed up or reduce the
workload of the judges and their cabinets. The suppression of hearings in a few
trademark cases assists in reducing the time for producing decisions, but this is
limited to a number of cases of a relatively modest size and complexity.
Nor has the backlog been reduced due to a reduction in the number of cases filed.
On the contrary, the number of applications increased up to 2014, though it fell in
2015. So the reduction of the backlog could have been achieved only by means of a
disproportionate increase in the number of judicial decisions, which is what in fact
occurred. Moreover, this reduction does not appear to have been obtained through
reducing the quality of the judgments delivered. Such a claim has, in any event, never
been analyzed, let alone sustained.
5.1.3. The fundamental benefit of a serious system of productivity 
control
The benefits of a serious system of productivity control had been underlined in a
2011 document of the Council111. This system, recommended by the author and
applied in the General Court after 2011, is based on the preparation of a number of
lists. The first is based on the informal time limits within which members of the
General Court are enjoined to circulate case documents. A preliminary report is to be
submitted four months after the end of the written procedure and a draft judgement
circulated two months after the date of the hearing. The first list thus consists of a
chart containing a record of the time taken to prepare these documents where it
exceeds these deadlines. The second list sets out all delayed cases in each cabinet
and describes the measures taken to eliminate those delays. The third list divides all
cases attributed to each judge under three categories: competition, trademarks and
others, over a three year period. This allows one to identify any imbalance in the
111 See Council Doc. 16904/11.51
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The fourth list contains the number of cases closed per quarter and per year by each
judge.
The combined effect of these lists was that, for the first time, it was possible for every
judge to see exactly where the sources of any delays lay, whether there were objec-
tive justifications for such delays and whether measures were being taken to address
the problem. Everyone could assess everyone else’s workload, thereby dissipating a
lot of erroneous presumptions112. Transparency and responsibility are simple, but
quite powerful instruments.
Of course, such statistical instruments must be used with care113. Producing
judgments is not akin to producing cans of beef. Firstly, though cases are distributed
according to three categories, it is difficult to assess the real level of difficulty of each
individual case. Secondly, other factors can intervene to modify the real workload. A
series of cases, for example, will present similar difficulties, which make them collec-
tively easier to decide. What looks like a voluminous case may be dismissed as
inadmissible. Thirdly, an evaluation of the quality of judgments is impossible: other
than perhaps by examining the rate at which they are reversed on appeal. Nonethe-
less, experience has shown that it is necessary to have a global vision of a court’s
activity. Statistics do not mirror reality alone, but they are the first instrument by
which one may begin to understand it. This is not the full analysis, but its indispen-
sable basis.
5.1.4. The benefit of 9 additional legal secretaries
In 2014, after having suggested this since 2011, the General Court received 9
additional legal secretaries. It was decided to attribute one to each chamber. The
measure aimed at prioritising delayed cases. Recruitment was unnecessarily compli-
cated by the uncertainty surrounding the provisional character of this measure.
Nonetheless, it proved to be possible to hire experienced personnel, whose assis-
tance clearly contributed to the GC’s strong improvement in its 2014 results.
112 As indicated by the author in 2011, the benefits of a serious management system are unfortunately often as
strongly opposed in many courts as they are underestimated, see The Reform of the EU Courts I, p. 13-14. 
113 An excellent example of the errors which can arise was provided by J. Quatremer. Though generally a very
well informed observer, in a post he stated that: “ il y a un vrai problème de productivité au sein du
Tribunal: si le président Jaeger a bouclé 55 affaires en 2014, son collègue estonien, Lauri Madise, n’en
affiche que 9 à son compteur. Même si elle dépend aussi de la complexité des cas, il est clair qu’il y a un
problème de gestion des ressources humaines au sein de la Cour dans son ensemble.” « La réforme de la
Cour de justice européenne ou l’art de créer une usine à gaz », Libération, Les Coulisses de Bruxelles, 7 avril
2015. That comparison is erroneous. The President rules on applications for interim measures only,
whereas ordinary judges decide on full cases. Moreover it was very unfair on Judge Madise, who had only
just arrived in the previous October. The distortion is compounded by a production cycle that can take up to
three or four years in voluminous cases. Statistics thus share the characteristics of antibiotics that they are
necessary, but require very careful handling.52
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2014 was the first year since 2008 when no judge of the General Court arrived or left.
The composition of the chambers was unchanged, thus absolving any need for transi-
tional measures. This also contributed to the strong improvement in that year.
5.1.6. The benefits of the Art. 255 TFEU advisory panel
Another thing that is rarely mentioned in the context of the increase of productivity
is the Art. 255 TFEU advisory panel. Since 2010, most of this committee’s work has
been spent vetting candidates for the General Court, due to the higher turnover in
its composition. In four years the committee delivered 7 negative opinions114. At the
beginning of 2016, 3 more were delivered115. The committee’s intervention has also
had the effect of clearly improving the quality of the selection process in the Member
States.
The Article 255 committee has also provided an additional incentive to assist the
functioning of the General Court. In 2011, the author had recommended that it
should examine the statistical results of sitting judges presented for renewal116. In its
first activity report of 2011, the committee announced that it would do precisely
that117. Transparency and responsibility are simple, but powerful instruments.
5.2. Possible additional productivity measures without 
additional costs
5.2.1. Better allocation of personnel between the courts
The European Parliament has, quite rightly, begun to explore this topic. It is inter-
esting to note that, on the one side, the cabinets of the judges in the Court of Justice
have always been substantially larger than those of the judges in the General Court.
The personnel in their respective Registries are more or less of the same size. This is
notwithstanding the fact that there is a substantial difference in the nature of the
workload of the two registries. According to data provided by eCuria (the CJEU
electronic notification system for applications), the average case in the General
Court is four times more voluminous than the average Court of Justice case. This does
not mean that the case involves more important legal issues, but that it requires
114 Third Activity Report of the Panel Provided for by Article 255 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Euro-
pean Union, p. 9, available at: http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2014-02/rapport-
c-255-en.pdf.
115 D. Seytre, De nouvelles têtes à la mi-avril, Le Jeudi, 10 mars 2016.
116 The reform of the EU courts I, p. 17.
117 First Activity Report of the Panel Provided for by Article 255 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Euro-
pean Union, p. 3, http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/P_64268/53
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greater consideration when allocating personnel within the institution. The addition
of 9 legal secretaries to the GC in 2014 was a first (very timid) recognition of the need
for more personnel.
This is all the more so since it is now known, thanks to the trade unions, that the
Court has begun to make extensive use of administrative service responsible for
research and documentation in the institution to assist it in working on appeals and
preliminary references (see § 4.3). In fact, the discrepancy in the allocation of
resources between the two courts is consequently still greater than it appears at first
sight.
5.2.2. Dynamic exploitation of the new Rules of procedure
The GC new rules of procedure entered into force in 2015. In many ways, they
endeavour to simplify and accelerate the treatment of cases. More cases can be
adjudged without a hearing, with the consent of the parties (new Art. 106). Trade-
mark cases may be decided by a judge sitting alone (new Art. 29, paragraph 1).
5.2.3. Evaluation of legal assistants
Although the General Court has engaged in a collective evaluation of the cabinets’
performance since 2010, there is as yet no evaluation of performance of legal secre-
taries. After the introduction of an evaluation of cabinets’ performance, when a
cabinet’s productivity appears abnormally low, this would look like the adequate
next step. In cabinets in difficulty, important production discrepancies sometimes
appear and require a more detailed analysis.
5.2.4. Better use of the Registry
Another simple and economical way to improve output would be to enhance the role
of the Registry in the treatment of the admissibility of actions. Given the nature of
proceedings before the General Court these issues arise substantially more
frequently and are more complex than those that arise in cases before the Court of
Justice. The Registry could seek to propose standard solutions, with the benefit of
offering greater coherence in this field.
Since 2011, the General Court has asked for additional Registry personnel. The Court,
as an administrative authority, did not pursue this separately but rather integrated
this request into its legislative proposal. This had the consequence of postponing the
reduction of the backlog, thereby unfortunately creating an incentive to adopt a
heavy structural solution rather than a managerial one.54
THE REFORM OF THE EU COURTS (II)5.2.5. Possible recourse to judicial fees
A further, simple and economical way to reduce costs would be by levying judicial
fees118. This might discourage frivolous applications119. The Court of Justice finally
opened a reflection about this question in 2014, three years after the launch of its
legislative proposal. Since then Germany has sponsored a declaration about the topic
in the minutes of the Council. Needless to say, it would have been far more advanta-
geous to have examined the options before doubling the General Court, and not
afterwards. The opposite approach risks creating an excessive number of new
personnel, which could become redundant if the introduction of fees reduces the
number of applications.
Any imposition of judicial fees must respect the right to access to justice. Even
allowing for this constraint, different possibilities present themselves. For example,
charging fees for the introduction of manifestly frivolous applications in the realm of
intellectual property might be justified by the fact that such proceedings are a means
whereby applicants seek to obtain an economic advantage in the form of an exclu-
sive right.
5.3. Implications of doubling the judges for the management of 
the General Court
Doubling resources in any system of production is a great challenge. Nothing
produces more waste than a huge increase of resources, except for a huge increase
in resources that does not correspond to what is required: for instance where the
resource doubled (judges) is not necessarily that which ought to have been increased
(legal secretaries + Registry personnel). This is accentuated where the resource
needed in priority is reduced whilst at the same time the resource that is not needed
is increased. So the first thing to do is to assess the global resources available to the
General Court (judges, legal secretaries, assistants and Registry personnel).
5.3.1. Why doubling was far from the optimal solution
As indicated in 2011, the managerial approach would have implied first to examine
all productivity measures, then followed by an incremental increase in personnel
numbers, and finally, if required, structural reform. The Court of Justice chose to go
directly for the heaviest strategy. The cost of that choice has been compounded by
118 A possibility already exists to sanction, even moderately, the irregular behaviour of parties that generates
unwarranted additional spending for the courts. This possibility is of limited effect and it is not used very
often.
119 See The Reform of the EU Courts I, cit., p. 20; M. van der Woude, Judicial Reform and Reasonable Delay,
Journal of European Competition Law and Practice, 2012, pp.123-125.55
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future additional costs consequent upon each subsequent enlargement).
The doubling of the GC will create the largest international court in the world.
Doubling the size of a court can be a malediction in disguise. Though there are
obvious differences, it suffices to imagine if the same solution was to be imple-
mented in the Commission or in the Parliament. It is far from clear that the output of
either institution would improve (notably as regards quality). Some people have
sought to make comparisons with very large national first instance courts. Such an
analogy is, however, wholly misconceived if not dangerous. An international court is,
by definition, very different from a national court. The heterogeneity of its member-
ship is far greater, as is the instability in its composition for a number of obvious
reasons. Furthermore, in the EU Courts, members have two (and not simply one)
functions to perform. They must adjudicate on cases, but in so doing they reflect
their national legal orders. In an unstable and decentralized court of 56 members, an
enormous investment in time and energy will be required in order to protect the
coherence of its case-law without prejudicing the equality of the legal systems from
which its members are drawn. The theoretical benefit of a huge increase of judges
will at least be partly lost.
The weakness of this “reform” is that it creates too many top jobs while at the same
time promising to reduce the second and third tier of personnel in the cabinets.
Judges risk ending up in fact being paid highly to perform tasks that could be as easily
(and less expensively) performed by less qualified personnel. This is hardly an
efficient – or an economical – strategy.120 Furthermore, judges are the least stable
component of the whole system. Multiplying their number increases the instability
of the whole, whereas increasing legal secretaries and registry would have tended to
produce the opposite consequence.
Finally, creating a single large General Court concentrates all appeals in the Court of
Justice. As a result, as the trade unions indicated, an increasing part of the judicial
work of the Court of Justice has been surreptitiously transferred to the Court’s
administrative services by requiring them to carry out a preliminary analysis of
incoming cases. This examination is no longer limited to the preliminary analysis of
120 For J. Quatremer, this is not the only syndrome of a “Mexican army” in the Court of Justice of the European
Union. In another interesting article, he evoked the creation of a director job (the second level in the EU
administration) to manage a service of four persons, including two secretaries (J. Quatremer, UE Le super-
juge frôle le hors jeu, Les coulisses de Bruxelles, 5 juin 2015). This was done at the direct initiative of the
then President of the Court of Justice, without any input from its Registrar. The process also excluded
competition from outside the institution. The job was thus deemed sufficiently important to justify a high
rank and an exceptional appointment process, but not sufficiently important to be opened up to external
candidates. A managerial analysis of this process could be useful. Such problems had already been evoked
years ago by D. Seytre (voir Le Jeudi, 21 janvier 2010 et 16 juillet 2015).
Other examples evoked by the journalist also reflect a strong bias in favor of appointing legal secretaries to
a lot of high administrative posts. It could be interesting to audit how many examples exist. This could have
an impact in the institution’s management. The capabilities of a very good legal secretary are not neces-
sarily those of a very good manager, especially in a much bigger institution.56
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the Court of Justice’s judges, who have to digest the work of a great number of
collaborators (4 lawyers in the cabinet and those in the administration). Another is a
question of principle, since decisions of a judicial character are made by administra-
tors who are officials and therefore under the hierarchical power of the Court’s
Registrar121. Finally, it could seem paradoxical to seek to gather all appeals in the
Court of Justice whilst simultaneously trying to reduce the standard of review on
appeal or to introduce a filter (unless one accepts, as mentioned before, the reduc-
tion of effective judicial protection).
5.3.2. The Court of Justice and the General Court have different 
missions
It is a recurrent error to believe that the two courts are substantially the same. They
are not. The dichotomy between them tends to increase. It is important to under-
stand this, since it implies that it is not the case that what is good for one of them is
necessarily good for the other.
The Court of Justice deals basically with issues of law. The General Court deals with
issues of law and fact. When these facts comprise the evolution of servers and
patents (as in the Microsoft cases), or the entirety of problems linked to the market
for semiconductors (as in the Intel case), this can make an ocean of difference.
Hence, procedures before the General Court are, by their nature, longer. Files are
much heavier. As indicated above, the average General Court file is four times
heavier than in the Court of Justice. Judgments describing and adjudicating upon
facts are, by their nature, longer than those where the facts are either found
elsewhere or do not arise. The internal review and translation of such judgments
necessarily requires more time.
The Court of Justice operates in a largely centralized fashion. All cases are considered
at the level of the General Meeting and all important cases are sent to the Grand
Chamber of 15 judges, which is designed in order to reduce divergences in the inter-
pretation of EU law. In contrast, the General Court is very largely decentralized. All
applications are sent directly to chambers of three judges and 95% of them remain
there, 5% only being adjudicated upon by chambers consisting of five judges (during
the last decade). The risk of divergences in the interpretation of the law is thus
greater, although that threat is ameliorated by the right of appeal to the Court
against judgments of the General Court. Furthermore the discrepancy in the
workload between cases is greater in the General Court. It is consequently more diffi-
cult to balance the workload between its members.
121 For the sake of clarity, it would be much better if all persons dealing with the substance of cases were inte-
grated into the cabinets under the direction of judges and submitted to the same administrative rules. This
would additionally allow a much better evaluation of productivity per personnel unit in the institution.57
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post 2019
As already mentioned, various actors have supported a reduction of the size of
judges’ cabinets in the third phase of the reform in 2019. Since then this issue has
engendered considerable uncertainty over the future composition of the cabinets of
the General Court’s judges.
Nothing could be better designed to destabilize the functioning of cabinets. It is
sometimes considered that jobs are jobs, judges and legal secretaries are inter-
changeable, and that working for one judge is the same as working for another. Such
simplifications only demonstrate a gross ignorance of the management of highly
qualified personnel. Highly qualified personnel management is long term manage-
ment. This requires at least a perspective in the medium term that is at present
absent. Maintaining uncertainty during years is certainly not the best way to manage
individuals. It obviously complicates recruitments and creates disincentives for the
best qualified candidates.
Additionally, legal secretaries perform multifaceted and complex functions, which
point seems to have been lost in the budgetary negotiations connected with the
legislative proposal. In addition to legal and technical assistance, legal secretaries are
also capable of working on voluminous files in the working language of the General
Court. They are thus indispensable if the General Court is to continue to function
with a single working language. Consequently, adding judges whilst proportionately
reducing the number of legal secretaries is a textbook exemplar of an inefficient and
costly reform. It is akin to an enterprise that decides to double the size of its fleet of
trucks while reducing the volume of petrol. One does not need to be a rocket scien-
tist to conclude that this “reform” will not improve output and performance,
although this basic analysis was insufficiently obvious to the institutions who
promoted it122.
Finally, the proposed reduction in the cabinets’ personnel may reduce the stability of
their composition. It will also increase the individual workload of personnel in the
General Court, thus increasing the attraction of working in the Court of Justice,
where people are paid more for doing less work123.
122 This had already been emphasized in M. van der Woude, In favour of effective judicial protection: A
reminder of the 1988 objectives, Concurrences, 4/2014, p. 3
123 See The Reform of the EU Courts I, p. 18.58
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the General Court
Supported by the Commission and the Council, the 2011 proposal evoked the
question of specialization within the General Court. A lot of misconceptions surround
this topic. There are constitutional obstacles. There are managerial obstacles. There
is also the illusion that specialization of chambers and judges provides greater
productivity and a more coherent case law in an unstable court with permanent
renewals. Moreover specialization raises a large number of collateral problems,
which have not yet been considered. Again one is struck by the absence of any
impact assessment.
From the legal point of view, the TFEU offers two paths to the legislature. It can
expand the General Court, which the Treaties define as a generalist jurisdiction (Art.
254, paragraph 1 TFEU). Or it can create specialized courts (Art. 257 TFEU). Both
paths are legitimate. However if one respects the basic law of the Union, one cannot
combine these options by dividing the constitutionally mandated generalist court
into a cluster of specialized courts. The establishment of two generalist courts in the
EU system aims to provide an equal representation of national legal systems. This
cannot happen if judges from some Member States are automatically excluded from
participating in debates concerning fundamental principles in different areas of the
law.
Additionally, as already emphasized by Judge van der Woude of the General Court,
this creates “a risk of a politicisation of the distribution of judicial portfolios. These
issues can be dealt with but only if judicial independence is preserved so that the
General Court can organise itself in a flexible manner without external interference.
(…) It is important not to pass the issue of the nationality of judges… from the Council
to the General Court”124.
However, this hybrid solution appears to have become hugely attractive in the recent
past. In 2011, the Court of Justice’s proposal suggested the creation of specialized
chambers. The Commission has relentlessly pushed in favour of creating specialized
chambers inside the General Court125. Especially, it has proposed in 2011 to impose
“an adequate number of specialized chambers”126. The Court of Justice revived this
in 2015 by way of a declaration attached to the minutes of the Council which stated
that: “Finally, the Court of Justice recalls that on the occasion of the approval of the
revised Rules of Procedure of the General Court in January 2015, it invited the
124 M. van der Woude, In favour of effective judicial protection: A reminder of the 1988 objectives, Concur-
rences, 4/2014, p. 3.
125 This possibly proceeds from a wish to prevent the creation of a specialized competition court. The Commis-
sion is well aware that judges specialized in competition matters might increase further the intensity of
judicial control of its own decisions. It may also be observed that the Commission has completely reversed
its position on this issue between 2007 and 2011 – without proferring the slightest explanation.
126 Opinion of 30.9.2011, § 37 [COM (2011) 596].59
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a proposal regarding the creation of specialized chambers within the General Court
and to align its internal rules governing the attribution of cases in the General Court
with those that the Court of Justice applies.”127 Later, the European Parliament
supported in its amendments the doubling of the General Court, while aiming to
maintain the appointment process of the specialized courts. In a 2016 interview, the
new President of the Court of Justice K. Lenaerts indicated that the connexions
between cases could be very widely interpreted in their attribution to judges,
without leading to specialization128. This would however in time lead in fact to
specialized chambers and judges.
Specialization could lead to increased productivity, provided it is implemented in a
definitive and long term manner. However such an approach is precluded both by
the existence of a generalist court and the manner in which it is composed. That
explains the strong managerial logic behind allowing for specialization... in special-
ized courts, as foreseen by the Nice Treaty. The paradox of doubling of the General
Court is precisely that it generates new obstacles on that path. Furthermore special-
ization is intimately linked to the system for attributing cases to judges. It is revealing
that the Court of Justice, from 2011 to 2015, has consistently linked both topics. This
is all the more astonishing when it is quite obvious that none of the institutions
evoking specialization have taken even five minutes to reflect upon the conse-
quences its introduction would have for the management of the General Court’s
personnel.
It is thus fascinating to read Art. 3 § 1 of Regulation 2015/2422. This provision
indicates that a report, prepared by an external consultant, will be made on the
functioning of the General Court. “In particular, that report shall focus on the
efficiency of the General Court, the necessity and effectiveness of the increase to 56
Judges, the use and effectiveness of resources and the further establishment of
specialized chambers and/or other structural changes.” In addition to presuming that
the General Court is prepared to establish such chambers, someone from the legis-
lature will doubtless explain how this provision is compatible with the Treaties,
especially the need for equal representation of the national legal systems.
5.3.5. The need for a serious reflection about the attribution of 
cases
Here again constitutional constraints intrude on the fantasies pedalled in certain
circles. Operating in the framework of Article 6 ECHR, the jurisprudence of the
European Court of Human Rights imposes clear constraints upon the attribution of
127 Statement by the Court of Justice, annex to Draft Position of the Council at first reading, 10043/1/15 REV1
ADD 1.
128 Le Jeudi, 27 janvier 2016.60
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by law. There must thus be safeguards against the arbitrary exercise of the power of
the president of a court to assign or reassign cases to judges129. There is little doubt
but that this jurisprudence applies – a fortiori – to the EU courts. Thus every year the
General Court must publish in the Official Journal its criteria for the attribution of
cases. This requirement has been maintained in its new rules of procedure (Art. 25,
paragraph 2). At present cases are allocated by reference to three criteria in the
following order: reference number of the case, existence of previous related cases
(connexity) and workload130.
The case number is the basic criterion, which enhances transparency and foreseea-
bility. Connexity operates to prevent duplication of work. Thus a series of related
cases (in competition or State aid, for example) will be attributed to the same
chamber and, more often than not, to the same reporting judge. Approximately 40%
of cases are currently attributed by reference to this criterion. Whilst it might be
contended that this is a nascent form of specialization, it is temporary, limited in
volume, and is grounded upon very concrete functional considerations. Since the
operation of this criterion can give rise to considerable imbalances in the workload
between cabinets, the third criterion exists to allow that balance to be re-estab-
lished. A further guarantee is that a decision to attribute cases must be reasoned.
The new rules of procedure have introduced the possibility of a reattribution of
cases, but again under strict conditions131.
Many actors have tried to influence the attribution of cases inside the General Court.
The Court of Justice has repeatedly attempted to impose its own system for the attri-
bution of cases on the General Court. This system is strongly authoritarian since it
confers upon its President a total discretion in the attribution of cases. Until now
there has been very little investigation into the compatibility of this system with the
jurisprudence of the ECHR, especially applied to the General Court. In any case, the
two systems are clearly opposed and, repeatedly, the General Court has endeav-
oured to maintain its own for various reaons132. Nonetheless the secretariat of the
Council has come up with the same idea and the Commission has repeated it133. The
General Court is thus the only court in Europe for which the attribution of cases to
129 See, for example, case DMD Group/Slovakia, judgement of 5 october 2010, application n° 19334/; Case
Kontalexis/Greece, Judgment of 31 May 2008, application n° 59000/08, Case of Parlov-Tkalcic v. Croatia,
judgment of 22 December 2009, application n° 2481/06.
130 See OJ 2013, C 313/4.
131 See Art. 27 of the new Rules of Procedure (OJ 2015, L 105).
132 Finally, it must be mentioned that the system of discretionary attribution of cases by the President of the
Court of Justice to its members has been described as an instrument of a power system. It has been
described as creating strong incentives for judges to support the President’s decisions in the administrative
or the legislative domains (see J. Quatremer, La justice européenne au bord de la crise de nerfs, Libération,
Coulisses de Bruxelles, 26 avril 2015 (mise à jour 30 avril 2015)).
133 See the Commission’s opinion on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the
Council on the transfer to the General Court of the European Union of jurisdiction at first instance in
disputes between the Union and its servants, COM (2016) 81, § 10.61
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is sometimes done in ways that are not always transparant.
From the viewpoint of the rule of law, it is inacceptable that other institutions or
courts seek to determine how a court decides to attribute judicial cases between its
members134. This flies in the face of the principle of judicial independence. To make
matters worse, these pressures emanate from the same institutions and authorities
the decisions of which are challenged by citizens in the General Court.
5.4. A great opportunity lost for judicial management
In a nutshell, this debate was conducted without a thorough analysis of the possibil-
ities offered by serious managerial reforms. Member States were initially eager to
reject the Court’s proposal for budgetary reasons, but radically changed their
approach when they were promised one judge each. They then required some reduc-
tion in personnel by way of budgetary compensation, the consequences of which
was not seriously analysed. It was so decided that the General Court would receive a
lot of judges it had not asked for, and would suffer a reduction of the less expensive
personnel that it had requested. The four main political groups in the European
Parliament then decided to rush this essential constitutional reform through,
without conducting an impact assessment or a costs/benefits analysis of the possible
solutions, at a time when the urgency of the measure had disappeared since the
General Court had in fact got control over its backlog in the meantime.
Since internal reforms in the General Court had considerably reduced the backlog
and had reduced the length of proceedings, so much that, by end 2015, the press
indicated that a court the size of which was soon to be practically doubled was in
fact... looking for files to transfer to its new members135. By then it had become
crystal clear that the internal measures taken, combined with a small increase in
resources (9 additional legal secretaries), had largely sufficed to resolve the problem
of the backlog. The very small increase of personnel necessary to obtain this excel-
lent result shows that more important improvements could still have be obtained
through new limited and targeted increases of personnel. In place of that, as
observers concluded, “once the court’s backlog has been reduced and there are
fewer appeals being filed, the extra judges may find themselves underemployed in
the Grand Duchy.”136 Worse, at the beginning of 2016, the persisting uncertainty
about the cabinets’ personnel, the arrival of many new judges, the need to restruc-
134 The General Court’s President had already criticized this general tendency in 2014: M. Jaeger, L’avenir des
juridictions européennes, in CCBE, EU courts – Looking forward, 2014, p. 44.
135 M. Newman, EU’ general Court sees ‘dramatic drop’ in new cases, judge says; Mlex, 30 September 2015 (it
was then explained that cases should be heard by larger chambers of 5 judges “to occupy the new judges”);
D. Seytre, “Une insulte à l’intelligence”, Le Jeudi, 4 November 2015.
136 K. Lunders and M. Newman, Bottleneck eases at EU court, as new judges prepare to arrive, MLex, 9 Febr.
2016.62
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effect of destabilizing the entire General Court, thus threatening the good results
obtained in the recent past.
In the present context of budgetary constraints, it is of the highest importance that
all EU and national institutions endeavour to look as much as possible for produc-
tivity solutions, often times based on the clever use of information and communica-
tion technologies137. In an era of an aging population, heavy public debt and limited
increases in productivity, huge increases in personnel, and especially in top
personnel, must be limited to what is strictly necessary. Developments in the General
Court between 2011 and 2015 reflect the benefits of such a management approach.
Unfortunately the legislative debate has gone in precisely the opposite direction. All
of the EU institutions involved must draw lessons from this bad experience for the
future.
The opposition of all EU institutions to the creation of specialized courts will provoke
additional difficulties in the field of patents. During the long search for a truly
integrated EU patent, patent specialists have repeatedly (and rightly) requested the
establishment of a specialized patent court. The drastic abandonment of this concept
will make the creation of such a patent substantially more difficult138.
Finally, the wise balance conceived by the Court of Justice and inaugurated by the
Nice Treaty between generalist and specialized EU courts has also been lost in this
saga. EU courts fulfil two different functions: they take judicial decisions whilst
guaranteeing some balance between national legal systems. Confronted with the
rise of judicial activity, the Nice Treaty retained two generalist courts and envisaged
the creation of specialized tribunals under certain conditions. Specialized courts are
more productive and less expensive. They allow for the appointment of highly quali-
fied and specialized personnel at all levels139. They also allow for a greater adapt-
ability of procedures to meet the needs of identifiable categories of cases. It would
137 See for example P. Dunleavy and L. Carrera, Growing the productivity of government services, Elgar, 2013.
Among many modest but useful ICT improvements that could be made, the electronic flow of judicial docu-
ments is not complete yet, for example. eCuria, the electronic signification system of the CJEU, does not yet
allow a full display of all procedural documents. There also remain three different electronic codes (ECLI)
for the jurisprudence (this is rather too much for a single institution, and provokes useless work). The
search for productivity is a daily struggle, in big and small things.
138 For more detailed comments, see F. Dehousse, The unified court on patents: The new oxymoron of Euro-
pean law, Egmont Paper n° 60, 2013.
139 For observers such as J. Quatremer, establishing a principle of equal representation of all Member States
everywhere in the judicial system is an important political decision. It annihilates all influence of demog-
raphy in judicial appointments. It also makes a quality recruitment process more difficult, especially in
states with very limited populations (see J. Quatremer, La réforme de la Cour de justice européenne, ou
l’art de créer une usine à gaz, Les coulisses de Bruxelles, 7 avril 2015 (updated 13 avril 2015)).
This was also emphasized by Judge Forwood (The General Court as a Competition Tribunal: Still Fit for
Purpose?”, Clifford Chance and Brick Court Chambers Lecture, London, 28 October 2015). “Nominating two
judges might not be a problem for larger Member States, or Member States that have long been part of the
EU, but, as Judge Forwood recently observed: it might be ‘hard {…} for many {others} to find appropriately
qualified people who are willing to do the job’” (quoted by M. Abenhaim, Epilogue, at last, on the reform of
the General Court, 26 January 2016).63
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the EU institutions abandoned this finely balanced system in favour of a more
cumbersome and expensive solution, risking an increase in the polarisation of judicial
appointments and certainly increasing the intergovernmental character of the EU
judicial system. The doubling of the General Court has clearly not been the EU insti-
tutions’ finest hour.64
6. LESSONS FOR THE EXERCISE OF THE COURT’S 
LEGISLATIVE POWER
6.1. The need for a global, long term, strategy
Over time different goals have been set for the reform of the General Court: reduc-
tion of the backlog, reduction of the length of proceedings, bigger chambers, coher-
ence of jurisprudence, new regime of appeals, transfers of additional jurisdiction
from the Court of Justice to the General Court. To bring about fundamental reform
requires a far clearer vision of its long term objectives. Since the goals changed
frequently, the clarity of the design inevitably became far from clear, which may
explain the description of the changes as “a leap in the dark” by some observers.
As indicated by the author in 2011, any systemic initiative must begin with a reflec-
tion on the Court of Justice. Its size is (rightly) limited by the Treaties. The Court of
Justice has adopted the opposite approach, instead concentrating on the courts
beneath it in the judicial hierarchy. Consequently, elements directly touching upon
the Court of Justice began to surface late in the debate (appeals, transfers of compe-
tence) without being adequately addressed.
6.2. The need for greater transparency
In carrying out its legislative role, the Court of Justice has sometimes performed
below the standards usually demanded of an actor in a legislative procedure. Legis-
lative procedures must respect specific constraints according to the EU Treaties. At
the very least, all documents emanating from the Court should be approved by the
Court of Justice’s general meeting, catalogued in a specific register, and be accessible
to the public on an identifiable area of its web site.
6.3. The need for more formal procedures
Official documents related to any legislative procedure should be adopted by a
specific college of the institution by means of reasoned procedure. Decisions by the
President of the Court of Justice acting alone do not comply with such standards. This
was especially the case with regard to unpublished letters from the President of the
Court of Justice to the presidents of other institutions (as disclosed in the European
Parliament). In addition, the use of undated, unregistered and unsigned documents
by the Court of Justice in the course of a legislative procedure should be prohibited,
not least because it generates opaqueness in the legislative process. It is impossible
to justify a legislative reform with constitutional consequences on the basis of
documents for which no-one wants to take responsibility. Impact assessments65
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present a legislative proposal to the institution as a whole, and not to one court only.
6.4. The need for a better consultation process
Consultation of interested parties has become a standard feature of all legislative
procedures. This is especially the case when the proposals present a structural, or
even a quasi-constitutional character. The Court of Justice should apply that same
principle when it conducts its legislative initiatives. From this point of view, it is very
instructive to make a comparison with the reform process of the European Court for
Human Rights during the last decade.
6.5. The need for a general reflection on the legislative role of 
the Court of Justice
In the light of the recent lengthy and controversial process, it is time to seriously
reflect on the provisions of Article 281 TFEU, which provides that the European
Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative proce-
dure, may amend the provisions of the Statute of the Court of Justice (protocol n° 3
to the TFEU)141, with the exception of some of its provisions, at the request of the
Court of Justice and after consultation of the Commission, or on a proposal from the
Commission and after consultation of the Court of Justice
Article 281 was introduced in the Lisbon Treaty without much reflection. It appeared
at the time to be in the nature of a simple alteration of procedures from Treaty
revision to a legislative procedure. With hindsight, that transfer appears far less
simple. At least for some observers, part of the problems that appeared between
2011 and 2015 were provoked by the absence of sufficient procedural constraints
and checks and balances, allowing an autocratic system of management to prevail142.
Whilst this could be remedied, another element has its roots in a structural problem.
In all fairness, for a court involved directly in a legislative process, there are
sometimes no good decisions. For example, in the 2011 proposal, the Court did not
propose any mechanism whereby the Member States could select 12 judges from
among their number. It considered that such a proposal fell outside the scope of its
duties, which claim was both right and wrong. For a court, it is of course most unusual
to begin to negotiate such a process with the Member States. However, negotiation
140 The Commission, in principle, has to carry out an impact assessment meeting strict requirements for
submission to a specific board for evaluation in respect of all initiatives likely to have significant economic,
environmental or social impacts. See Better Regulation Guidelines 2015: http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regula-
tion/guidelines/ug_chap3_en.htm. See also http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/impact/ia_in_other/
docs/ii_common_approach_to_ia_en.pdf.
141 OJ L 228 of 23.08.2015, p.1.
142 See comments quoted at § 4.5.66
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approach when granting such a legislative role to a court. Additionally, lobbying
obviously falls outside the normal duties of a court. However, in 2015, such lobbying
took place. The President of the Court visited the President of the Parliament,
presumably to press home the benefits of his proposal. Some members of the Court
of Justice visited the EPP Group (having obtained the authorization required of the
General Meeting)143. This raised other questions in the Parliament, amongst which
one might include the following: Was the contact with the Parliament’s President not
also a contact with the S&D Group? What contacts were had with the other groups?
If none, why were they ignored? The same question was asked about President
Skouris’ (subsequently authorised) visit to members of the German Government.
Why not visit other Member States? And where does this noria stop? Such visits
seem shocking, but they are nonetheless a logical consequence of Article 281. This
leads to the conclusion that the provision creates a dangerous confusion of powers
that will always generate serious tensions in a system that is purportedly grounded
upon the principle of the separation of powers. This seems also globally the analysis
of the new Court of Justice’s president144.
The best solution would appear to be to simply repeal the legislative initiative of the
Court of Justice. The Court should be able to present requests for legislative change
in the limited fields in question, but the Commission would be responsible for taking
and thereafter promoting what would have become its proposal145.
If this best option is not adopted, the second best option would be to impose some
serious procedural constraints upon all legislative requests from the Court of Justice.
In particular this competence ought to be attributed to the institution as a whole and
not one of its constituent courts. Moreover, following the European Parliament’s
recommendation in its resolution of 29 April 2015, a clear separation should be
established within the institution between judicial decisions and administrative or
legislative decisions, thereby permitting the possibility of a proper judicial review of
the latter. Otherwise, the institution could find itself in a serious mess in adjudicating
upon applications relating to legislative acts the Court had sponsored and promoted.
143 See D. Seytre, Justice européenne: La Cour, une institution dans la tourmente?, Le Jeudi, 17 septembre
2015; A. Allemano, Where do we stand on the reform of the EU’s Court System? On a reform as short-
sighted as the attempts to force through its adoption, 23 September 2015.
144 « En tant que professeur de droit constitutionnel européen, j’attire votre attention sur le fait que ce n’est
pas la Cour mais les Etats membres qui ont rédigé l’article 281 du traité sur le fonctionnement de l’UE. La
Cour ne l’a jamais demandé, je peux vous le garantir. Ils ont donné cette initiative à la Cour, mais il est tout
aussi clair que nous ne sommes pas normalement impliqués dans un tel processus. Ce n’est pas à moi de
juger le traité. Il fallait l’appliquer. Je n’aurais pas rédigé cet article de cette manière. Mais c’est dans le
traité. Nous avons dû jouer notre rôle même si nous ne sommes peut-être pas idéalement équipés pour le
jouer. » (Le Jeudi, 17 janvier 2016).
145 This should be compensated by granting the EU Courts a greater autonomy over their internal organization.
Presently, any change of the rules of procedure necessitates a cumbersome process, giving a strong and
unhealthy exclusive influence to the Members States in the Council. Moreover this system can occasionally
provoke conflicts of interests.67
CONCLUSIONS
The proposal to enlarge the General Court was the first legislative initiative taken by
the CJEU in the framework of the Lisbon Treaty, and was also the first participation
of the European Parliament in such a debate. It has brought about a massive change
in the entire judicial system of the EU. For the future, it is extremely important to
draw the proper institutional lessons.
• There was a fundamental difference between the Court of Justice’s first and
second proposals, on the one hand, and the third and final one, on the other. The
stakes in the third proposal were far higher. It aimed not only to increase the
number of judges (in a more disproportionate way) but also to dissolve a court
and to change the three layer EU judicial system into one of two layers. This had
collateral consequences for the appointment process, the geographic basis of
judges’ recruitment, the management of personnel, and the appellate process.
The proposal has stimulated opposition in various quarters. It also made the
absence of impact assessment and wide consultation process even more
shocking.
• The Member States’ inability to agree on anything but a simple multiplication of
judges aggravated the situation. It made the appointment of judges in specialized
courts more difficult, and thus provided an excuse for their abolition, though they
were obviously more quality oriented, more productive, and more economical. It
also provoked a doubling of the General Court, which was manifestly excessive.
This incapacity to compromise on EU appointments is not limited to judicial ones
(as revealed before by the excessive growth of the Commission). This weakness
has clearly become a source of useless spending by the EU.
• The special legislative procedure has been especially long and hard fought. This is
true both inside the CJEU and between the CJEU and some components of the
European Parliament. It would be wise to prevent similar circumstances arising in
the future.
• The proposal was made without any impact assessment or external consultation.
There was nothing resembling the associative process which generally surrounds
legislative proposals, especially of a para-constitutional nature, in the EU. Here
too, a reflection should be opened on the constraints that apply to the CJEU when
it initiates a legislative proposal.
• The position of the other institutions during the negotiation was sometimes
surprising. For example, in the first phase, the Commission’s 2011 opinion
insisted on the need to protect the stability of the General Court. This point was
completely forgotten in the second phase. In the first phase, the Council
expressed substantial doubts about the need to increase the number of judges.69
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doubts paradoxically largely vanished. Nor did the Parliament consider the
proposal worthy impact assessment or costs/benefits analysis.
• The effective rejection of recourse to specialized courts in the EU judicial system
is a fundamental strategic choice. Firstly, it strengthens the Member States’ role
in the appointment of judges. The choice of candidates by a committee consisting
of specialists is replaced by decision making by the Member States. In this sense,
this is a strongly intergovernmental reform. Secondly, the reform establishes in a
complete way the principle of equal representation of the Member States in the
EU Courts (the committee in charge of the CST had supported informally a
balance between big and small Member States). This will have important conse-
quences on the recruitment of EU judges.
• Rejecting recourse to specialist courts will accentuate future difficulties in estab-
lishing an EU court for a truly integrated patent. Patent specialists call rightly for
the appointment of a specialized court, which will not be possible under the new
approach.
• The reform was not only about the increase of the judges’ number. It also
concerned the organization of the General Court. The Court of Justice pushed
strongly in the Council for some specialization inside the General Court and also
for a system of the discretionary attribution of cases to judges. So did the
Member States and the Commission. However none of these actors saw fit to
consult the General Court as to how it might wish to manage its internal affairs.
This calls for further reflection about the need to protect the organisational inde-
pendence of the EU courts.
• The specialization of the General Court raises another specific question in that
framework. Contrary to the Court of Justice, the General Court functions in a
decentralized way with chambers of three judges constituting the basic forma-
tion of judgment. In such a framework, specialization by one national judge can
have a strong impact on the outcome of cases. The same could be said about the
discretionary attribution of cases by the President to the judges. Here, too, the
Court of Justice and the General Court are organized very differently. Such a
discretionary attribution may have a strong impact on the result of proceedings.
Additionally, would such a non-transparent and opaque system for the attribu-
tion of cases comply with the standards imposed by the European Court of
Human Rights regarding the right to a fair trial?
• This legislative procedure invites a general reflection on the very exceptional
legislative role that has been conferred upon the Court of Justice. From a public
law viewpoint, one searches in vain to find an equivalent accumulation of power
in the Member States. Supreme Courts do not enjoy a right of legislative initia-
tive, let alone a quasi-monopoly over it. The events of the last four years tend to70
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bitant prerogative. Should it be retained, its exercise must be subject to specific
constraint.
• Finally, the doubling of the General Court is not in fact a “reform”. On the
contrary, it is a great example of a purely mechanical vision of public service
reform. In general, the benefits of such an approach are strongly overestimated,
and its costs strongly underestimated. In fact neither the EU institutions, nor the
Member States, nor even many other interested parties, opened a reflection in
depth about the real functioning of the EU courts, or the efficiency and costs of
the possible reforms. This is a saddening conclusion (especially for the author),
but this is a fact. This has brought the EU judiciary to a most paradoxical situation
since all judicial national systems have simultaneously followed the opposite
approach due to budgetary cuts and the search for higher productivity. The
approach followed for the EU courts is not to be recommended for the future.
One can only hope that, in the next decades, all of the EU institutions involved will
pay more attention to the long term benefits of productivity measures (and
specialized courts) – thereby fully respecting the quality of justice, recruitment of
staff, productivity of judges and, finally, the not unreasonable expectation that
public funds should be put to use only after the most careful consideration.71
ANNEX I
UNDATED, UNSIGNED AND UNREGISTERED PAPER FROM THE 
COURT OF JUSTICE SENT TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND 
THE COUNCIL
REFORM OF THE GENERAL COURT
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION CONCERNING QUESTIONS RAISED DURING 
DISCUSSIONS IN THE LEGAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
Figures and trends of the last few years, as expressed in the consecutive annual
reports, confirm that a structural reform of the General Court is necessary.
The General Court has taken advantage of the stability of its composition and the
work of the additional référendaires that the General Court obtained in 2014.
Six facts show, however, that this improvement has reached its limits:
1. The trend of the last seven years146
The trend shows that the number of new cases has grown steadily. Except for 2012,
the amount of new cases has always been higher than completed cases, therefore
making the amount of pending cases rise inexorably147. 2014 has been an excep-
tional year for the General Court as regards the increase of new cases, which will be
reflected in 2016 when all those cases will have reached the end of the written proce-
dure.
2. The situation regarding pending cases
The global amount of pending cases was 1393 at the end of March 2015. The situa-
tion can not be regarded as satisfactory, since it entails many complex and sensitive
cases. It is important to note the following statistics:
– The number of pending cases for which the written procedure is closed and that
have not been treated is 428. 135 of those cases were filed in the 2008-2012
period.
– The number of old pending cases in some areas considered as sensitive by
Member States, Institutions and businesses is worrying: at the end of March 2015
there were 112 cases pending in competition matters, among them some lodged
146 Measured by three-year averages of new cases: in 2007: 474; in 2008: 528; in 2009: 573; in 2010: 611; in
2011: 642; in 2012: 658; in 2013: 710; in 2014: 773.
147 Three-year averages of pending cases: in 2007, 1072; in 2008, 1120; in 2009, 1174; in 2010: 1223; in 2011:
1266; in 2013: 1290; in 2014:1328.73
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lodged in 2011149; agriculture (EAGGF): 60 pending cases, among them some
pending since 2010 and 2011150; restrictive measures: 106 pending cases, among
them some lodged in 2012151.
– No chamber has had or has a caseload below its capacity152.
3. The duration of proceedings
It is not possible to consider that the duration of proceedings is satisfactory and
meets the expectations that litigants are entitled to demand of a Union court. If the
average duration of proceedings was 23.4 months in 2014, it is of utmost importance
to keep in mind that those figures represent an average of cases of varying
complexity and to look at the figures regarding the length of average proceedings of
cases in sensitive areas such as state aid (32.5 months in 2014) and competition cases
(45.8 months in 2014).
Examples of the length of proceedings in some of the important judgments in those
two fields in 2014 include the following:
Judgments of 14 March 2014 in Cementos Portland Valderrivas v. Commission (T-296/
11), Buzzi Unicem v. Commission (T-297/11): 33.6 months; Judgment of 27 February
2014 in InnoLux v. Commission (T-91/11): 36.73 months; Judgment of 6 February 2014
in AC-Treuhand v. Commission (T-27/10): 49 months; Judgment of 27 March 2014 in
Saint-Gobain Glass France v. Commission (T-56/09 and T-73/09): 62.27 months;
Judgment of 12 June 2014, Intel v. Commission (T-286/09): 59.53 months; Judgment
of 17 July 2014, Westfälisch-Lippischer Sparkassen- und Giroverband v. Commission
(T-457/09): 56.9 months; Judgment of 7 November 2014, Autogrill España v. Commis-
sion (14/05/2010): 54.6 months; Judgment of 11 July 2014, DTS Distribuidora de
Televisión Digital v. Commission (T-533/10): 44.16 months; Judgment of 25 March
2015, Slovenská pošta a.s. v. Commission (T-556/08): 75 months.
4. The proportion of cases completed by a chamber of 3 judges
In 2007, the General Court modified its operation and working methods in order to
increase its efficiency. Since then, most cases153 have been completed by a chamber
148 A few examples: T-9/11 and 12 other cases in the Airfreight cartel, first case lodged on 6 January 2011; T-
47/10 and one other in the Heat stabilizer Cartel, first case lodged on 27 January 2011; T-389/10 and 20
others, Prestressing steel Cartel, first case lodged on 13 September 2010; T-486/11 Antitrust case
concerning Orange Polska pending since 2 September 2011.
149 A couple of examples: T-674/11 TV2 Danmark and T-479/11 France.
150 A few examples: T-3/11 Portugal v. Commission, T-516/10 France v. Commission, T-44/11 Italy v. Commis-
sion.
151 For example, T-163/12 Ternavsky v Council
152 At the end of 2014, the caseload of the chambers had increased compared to the figures of the end of 2013.
153 Between 2008 and 2014, only 85 cases out of 4605 were completed by a chamber of an extended composi-
tion (5 or more judges). In 2014, only 2% of cases were completed by chambers of 5 judges. In the last
seven years, only two cases have been completed by the Grand Chamber (13 judges).74
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of less consistency in the case law and more legal uncertainty for litigants. This situa-
tion cannot be seen as satisfactory, given the fact that the General Court is the only
EU jurisdiction that decides on fact and law in such cases.
5. The effect of translation on the length of proceedings
In 2014, on average, translation of the parties’ submissions took 1.4 months (2.1
months for state aid cases, 1.8 months for competition cases) and the translation of
the judgments themselves took 1.8 months (1.8 months for state aid cases, 3.7
months for competition cases). This is the absolutely minimum both for the Court of
Justice and for the General Court. Thus the translation has no negative impact on the
overall length of proceedings.
6. The Civil Service Tribunal
The problems at the General Court are also having an impact elsewhere in the EU’s
legal structure. The Civil Service Tribunal currently has more than 100 cases
suspended pending the outcome of appeals before the General Court, some of these
appeals date back to 2013. Given that the total number of pending cases before the
Civil Service Tribunal is 242, this court can only work on half of its pending cases, a
number which is well below the capacity of a court composed of seven judges.75
ANNEX II
COMMENT FROM JUDGE G. BERARDIS FOR THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT REQUESTED BY THE RAPPORTEUR (JUNE 2015)
1. THE TRENDS OF THE LAST SEVEN YEARS
A. “The amount of pending cases rise inexorably”
Pending cases as of March 31 2015
2010: 1300 – 78 suspended = 1222
2011: 1308 – 59 suspended = 1249
2012: 1237 – 68 suspended = 1169
2013: 1325 – 71 suspended = 1254
2014: 1423 – 131 suspended = 1292
2015: 1393 – 100 suspended = 1293
22.05.15: 1376 – 105 suspended = 1271
• Developments during the last 5 years show that there has been no “inexorable
increase” in the number of pending cases, the number of which has remained
more or less constant.
• With 1249 pending cases in 2011, the year of the proposal to increase the number
of judges by 12 (later by 9 in 2014) and 1293 pending cases in 2015, it is difficult
to understand why the Court considered it appropriate to ask the Council to
double the number of judges in 2014…
• The relationship between cases filed and closed is of only relative value, since
WORKLOAD must be distinguished from BACKLOG by reference to an average
time of +/- 24 months (regarded as acceptable and accepted in fact) for the treat-
ment of a case from the moment it is filed until the conclusion of the case by
judgment or otherwise.
• Note the inverse relationship between cases filed and closed as of 22 May 2015
since, as of that date, in 2015 the General Court had closed 312 cases as
compared with 265 cases filed.
B. “2014 has been an exceptional year for the General Court as regards the increase
of new cases, which will be reflected in 2016 when all those cases will have reached
the end of the written procedure”
The Court omits to say that, if 912 new cases were lodged in 2014:
– Close to 200 of them were divided into groups of cases with significant similari-
ties: 57 (attacking the same State aid measure), 51 (attacking the same State Aid77
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(restrictive measures – Ukraine), 9 (restrictive measures –Russia), 13 (attacking
the same dumping decision), 7 (attacking the same dumping decision). Each
group of these cases was usually attributed to a single Reporting Judge.
– In 2014 the General Court closed 814 cases.
– As of 18 May 2015, +/-230 of the 912 affaires filed in 2014 had already been
closed.
– The Court appears to have overlooked the fact that, as in its own case, all cases
are dealt with and progress in parallel, each at their own rhythm and taking into
account the conduct of the proceedings, procedural steps, translations etc…
2. THE SITUATION AS REGARDS PENDING CASES
B. “The global amount of pending cases was 1393 at the end of March 15”
• As of 22 May 2015 this figure stands at 1271, not counting cases that are
suspended. Divided by 28 judges, it works out at an average portfolio of 45 cases
per judge, which is manageable.
C. “The number of pending cases for which the written procedure is closed, and that
have not been treated, is 428”
• The origin of this figure is difficult to understand. It seems the Court refers to all
pending cases where the written procedure has been closed and which are there-
fore ready to be worked on. It should, however, be pointed out that the great
majority of these cases are already in the course of being worked upon. Most of
these cases were filed in 2014 and are therefore being treated within the
accepted time for dealing with cases. 50 of these cases were filed in 2013 and
only 10 prior to 2013. Moreover this abstract figure takes no account of the
procedural steps that may intervene in numerous cases (in 94 cases as of
31.03.2015). The Court cannot seriously claim that a case in which the written
procedure has just come to an end must be ruled on the following day, on pain of
it being otherwise being considered as “untreated”.
• Of itself, the figure is meaningless given the normal average of 24 months to close
a case and the application of the internal deadlines at each stage of the proce-
dure.
C. “135 of those cases were filed in the 2008-2012 period”
• It is entirely incorrect to say that 135 old cases have not yet been examined:
– As of 22.05.2015, there are 127 of such cases,of which
– 101 are, for all practical purposes,closed since the relevant judgements and
orders are being proof read and translated, which process does not involve
judges and their cabinets.78
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reasons (suspension, procedural steps, etc). By all indications they will be
closed at the end of 2015/beginning 2016.
D. “The number of old pending cases in some areas considered as sensitive by
Member States, Institutions and businesses, is worrying”
• The overall figures mentioned include ALL cases, including those filed between 1
January and 31 March 2015 and those filed in 2013 and 2014, the treatment of
which is being carried out within the average period of +/-24 months.
• As for competition cases, the 110 cases to which reference is made, which also
includes a number of groups of cases, are twice less numerous as compared to
2012 (when they amounted to 217).
• The references (see the footnotes to pages 3 to 6) to the oldest cases in the field
of competition law, state aid, agriculture, restrictive measures, etc., are wide of
the mark:
T-47/10: delivery of judgment scheduled for 15.07.2015
T-389/10 + 20 others: draft judgments adopted and in translation
T-486/11: oral hearing on 26.06.2015
T-674/11: oral hearing on 15.01.2015, draft judgment at proof
reading
T-3/11: delivery of judgment scheduled for 16.06.2015
T-516/10: delivery of judgement scheduled for 2.07.2015
T-44/11: delivery of judgement scheduled for 2.07.2015
T-163/12: judgement delivered on 12.05.2015
T-9/11 + 12 others: all oral hearings completed in May 2015
T-479/11: in hand after the procedure had been suspended.
Whilst it is true that the treatment of these cases has taken a certain amount of
time, that is essentially a problem of the past and is connected with delays in the
nomination of certain judges, the absence of a full complement of judges in
certain chambers etc. Since then, there has been a constant reduction in the
average duration of the procedure and there are no longer similar delays in the
treatment of new cases.
E. “No chamber has had or has a caseload below its capacity”
• At the request of judges who had exhausted their caseload, since 2014 the Pres-
ident of the General Court has reattributed cases (see the last note on this issue
of 20.05.2015).79
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The statements and figures contained in the Court’s text do not hold up to scrutiny:
• No-one claims that the figure of 23.4 months for duration of a procedure in 2014
(20.4 months in 2015!) is other than an average! It is completely normal for an
intellectual property case to last for 12 months and for a very complicated cartel
case in the field of competition law to take far longer, particularly since, in most
cases, the latter consists of a group of cases that require treatment in parallel.
• Aside from the fact that they are limited in number, the specific cases mentioned
above are all extremely complicated and/or their treatment has been delayed for
different reasons, notably due to the fact that, during a certain period, the
General Court operated with less than a full complement of its members. Since
2013, the General Court is fully staffed, it has an additional judge (the judge of
Croatian nationality), it has had the benefit of the work of an additional 9 référen-
daires and it has carried out a series of internal reforms that have begun to bear
fruit significantly. Moreover the new Rules of Procedure will yet save more time.
• Again, this is an issue of the past: the current position is completely different and
the future outlook is positive. The Commission’s new policy of “full settlement”
in cartel cases has had a particularly important impact in reducing the number of
these cases being brought before the General Court.
4. THE PROPORTION OF CASES COMPLETED BY A CHAMBER OF 3 JUDGES
“Since 2007 … most cases have been completed by a chamber of 3 judges … leading
to a risk of less consistency in the case law and more legal uncertainty for litigants”
This statement is utterly groundless. It should be pointed out that, save for appeals
in staff cases, the General Court delivers decisions at first instance. These can thus be
appealed against to the Court which has the last word as to their quality.
In that regard, it may be observed that, since 2007, the percentage of General Court
decisions appealed against has varied from between 20% in 2014 to 30% in 2011. As
appears from the table below, in the period 2010 – 2014, the percentage of these
appeals dismissed or struck out has varied at between 78% and 85%:
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Number of appeals 88 124 129 160 158
Number of appeals dismissed/struck out 77 109 113 140 13080
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“The translation has no negative impact on the overall length of proceedings”
This statement is one-quarter true.
It takes account of the time required to translate a judgment or order only. It does
not take account of the time to translate pleadings and the report for the hearing,
which systemically delays fixing the date of the oral hearing in cases where the
language of the case is other than the General Court’s internal working language.
• Delays in translation have a considerable impact on the length of proceedings. In
the more complicated cases (competition, state aid), which are more voluminous
and take longer to complete, several months can be absorbed in translation.
• Moreover, one cannot over look the average of two months taken to read and to
proof judgments, which can be greater in complex cases (thus in part explaining
the additional time required to deliver judgment in them).
• Taken together, the time required by readers, correctors and translators in the
most difficult of cases can be very considerable and can amount to more than 6
months in the average competition case.
6. THE CIVIL SERVICE TRIBUNAL
“The Civil Service Tribunal currently has more than 100 cases suspended pending
the outcome of appeals before the General Court”
• This presentation is particularly deceitful.
As of 20 May 2015, 36 appeals against decisions of the Civil Service Tribunal are
pending before the General Court:
– 7 date from 2013 and their treatment is at a very advanced stage (for 3 of
them the date of delivery of judgment has already been fixed);
– 21 date from 2014: for 9 of them the written procedure is yet to finish or has
just done so, 4 are at the draft judgment stage.
• In 2014 the average time taken to rule on an appeal was 12.8 months.
The conclusion that, as a result of these appeals, the CST can work on only half of its
cases, which is “well below the capacity of a 7 judge court”, is made in bad faith.
Moreover one cannot see how the Court, which in 2014 took an average of 14.5
months to adjudicate on appeals, could assume that adjudicating on staff cases
would be any faster particularly since, in 2016, it will acquire that jurisdiction should
the proposal to double the number of judges in the General Court be implemented.81
ANNEX III
PRESS RELEASE OF THE COUNCIL SECRETARIAT (JUNE 2015)
EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE: COUNCIL BACKS REFORM OF GENERAL COURT
On 23 June 2015, the Council backed a proposal to reform the General Court, aimed
at enabling it to face an increasing workload and ensuring that legal redress in the EU
is guaranteed within a reasonable time.
The General Court is one of three courts of the European Court of Justice, the other
two being the Court of Justice itself and the Civil Service Tribunal. The General Court
is the court of first and last resort for the majority of decisions taken by the Commis-
sion and other EU organs, in all areas where the European Union holds competences.
Accelerated increase of caseload
According to the latest figures, the number of new cases arriving per year before the
General Court increased from fewer than 600 prior to 2010 to 912 in 2014, resulting
in an unprecedented 1393 pending cases at the end of March 2015. This rapid pace
of increase in the General Court’s caseload is likely to continue. For example,
following the completion of the Banking Union, a new number of new cases related
to the banking sector are now reaching the General Court. The strengthening of the
General Court will enable the European Union to meet these new challenges.
The large and increasing number of pending cases prevents the General Court from
delivering judgements within a reasonable time. The average time to deliver
judgments in the most economically sensitive cases is between four and five years,
while the average length generally considered acceptable is around one year. Article
47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights provides for the right to receive a judgement
within a reasonable period of time.
Reform measures
The reform proposal backed by the Council provides for a progressive increase in the
number of judges at the General Court and for the merging of the Civil Service
Tribunal with the General Court. In 2015, the number of judges would increase by 12.
In 2016, the seven posts of judges from the Civil Service Tribunal would be trans-
ferred to the General Court to which nine further judges would be attributed in 2019.
In total, this means 21 additional judges at the end of the process. This increase in
the number of judges will also allow the General Court to have chambers of five
judges rather than three judges to address the cases which justify it.83
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Thanks to the efforts made by the Court, increasing the number of judges by 21 and
merging the Civil Service Tribunal with the General Court would cost €13.5 million
per year. These costs compare favourably with the €26.8 million claimed in several
actions for damages due to the delay in judgement.84
ANNEX IV
COMMENTS ON THE COUNCIL’S PRESS RELEASE FROM JUDGE 
A. COLLINS FOR THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
A REBUTTAL OF THE GSC’S Q&A ON THE DOUBLING OF THE GENERAL COURT
On June 23 2015 the General Secretariat of the Council (GSC) published a “Q&A on
the reform of the General Court”. This is a rebuttal of its contents.
Why is a reform of the General Court needed?
GSC: “Because the General Court is faced with a rapidly increasing caseload which
prevents it from delivering judgements within a reasonable time. The number of new
cases per year increased from less than 600 until 2010 to 912 in 2014, resulting in an
unprecedented number of pending cases of 1393 at the end of March 2015.”
To end September 2015, 619 cases were filed in the General Court, compared with
757 cases filed to end September 2014. The number of pending cases at end
September 2015 is 1338, less than the “unprecedented number” cited at end March
2015. In any event almost half of these cases are not ready to be worked on. Between
January and September 2015 the General Court closed 704 cases, as compared to
559 in the same period in 2014. Far from “rapidly increasing”, the General Court’s
caseload is falling whilst year on year it closes a record number of cases.
What is the average time for the General Court to deliver a judgement?
GSC: “It takes the General Court currently on average two years to issue a judgement.
This is twice as long as what is generally considered permissible. It is worth to note
that article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights provides for the right to receive
a judgement within a reasonable period of time.
On the most economically sensitive cases (state aid and competition cases), the
average time to deliver judgments is even between four and five years. This causes
many difficulties to litigants, especially businesses, since they must keep aside impor-
tant financial resources pending a judgement. This has obvious consequences for
growth and jobs. As an example, fines amounting to more than €7 billion are
currently challenged in cases pending before the General Court.”
Absolutely nothing in the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the jurisprudence of the
Court of Justice or the European Court of Human Rights supports the extraordinary
claim that the General Court’s average of two years to deliver written judgments “is
twice as long as what is generally considered permissible.” On average it takes 8.7
months to complete the written procedure and 3.4 months to prepare judgments85
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target could ever be met. Moreover the average time to deliver judgment in
“economically sensitive cases” is closer to three, not “between four and five” years,
which time continues to fall.
What is the precise content of the reform the General Court?
GSC: “The reform consists in an increase of the number of judges by 21 in two steps
and the merger of the Civil Service Tribunal with the General Court. In 2015 the
number of judges would be increased by 12. In 2016, the seven posts of judges from
the Civil Service Tribunal would be transferred to the General Court by a merger of the
two courts. In 2019, the number of judges would increase by nine, bringing the total
number of judges to 56.”
The legislative proposal doubles the number of judges of the General Court from 28
to 56. It is legally impossible to “merge” the Civil Service Tribunal into the General
Court without an amendment of the Treaties, not least because the qualifications
and the method of appointment of judges of the General Court differ from those for
the judges of the Civil Service Court. Moreover the total cost of employing a judge of
the General Court is substantially greater than that of a judge at the Civil Service
Tribunal, as the European Parliament’s resolution of 29 April 2015 on the discharge
of the budget recognised.
Why to increase the number of judges? Would it not be sufficient to increase the
number of legal secretaries?
GSC: “The number of legal secretaries has already been increased in 2014 by nine
which helped to improve the productivity of the General Court. However, this
measure has reached its limits. In fact only judges have the right to participate in the
deliberations and to deliver judgements. To increase the number of judges would also
allow the General Court to dedicate to the cases the attention they deserve by
providing for the possibility to deliberate in chambers of five judges rather than of
three.”
By any definition an increase in the number of legal secretaries by 9 (i.e. one for every
three judges, which the GSC admits improved the General Court’s productivity)
cannot have “reached its limits” since that could happen only had that number had
been increased by 28 (i.e. one for each judge). Moreover the General Court itself is
of the opinion that an increase in the number of legal secretaries is a more propor-
tionate and appropriate measure than doubling the number of its judges. The time
and resources needed to prepare cases of a fact intensive and technical character for
hearing and deliberation is far greater than the time required to hear and rule upon
them. Finally, the General Court may deliberate in chambers of five judges, but
usually considers it unnecessary to do so.86
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GSC: “The costs of the reform would be rather limited and in fact constitute good
value for money. Thanks to the efforts made by the Court, the planned increase in the
number of judges and the merger of the Civil Service Tribunal with the General Court
would cost €13.5 million per year. This is only €2.3 million or 21% more compared to
an increase of the number of judges by 12, which has already been agreed by the
European Parliament. It is worth noting that the caseload increased by 43% from
2010 to 2014. The costs of the planned reform also compare favourably with the
€26.8 million claimed in several actions for damages due to the delay in judgement. ”
A judge of the General Court and his/her staff cost the taxpayer approximately €1M
per annum. The cost of doubling the number of judges at the General Court will thus
amount to in or around €28M each year. Allowing a generous €8M for savings from
the suppression of the Civil Service Tribunal, yields a figure of €20M. Moreover these
figures take no account of recruiting additional staff other than those directly
working for the judges (e.g. translators). The so called financial benefits are strongly
exaggerated, based as they are on the size of the claims, not the amounts that might
be awarded. The case law of the European Court of Human Rights shows that the size
of such awards is likely to be a small fraction of the sum to which the GSC refers.
Could the problem of the increasing caseload not be addressed by creating special-
ized courts?
GSC: “The creation of specialized courts would not constitute a viable alternative, for
a number of reasons. Specialized courts are not flexible: if the number of cases
increases substantially, the court is likely to be unable to cope with them. Specialized
courts would also increase the risk of inconsistency of EU law since there would
always be three courts that might be seized of similar issues: one by way of the
preliminary ruling procedure (Court of Justice), one by way of an appeal (General
Court) and one by way of direct actions (the specialised court). Specialized courts also
add complexity. Finally, specialized courts would be unnecessarily costly: each
requires a President and his or her Cabinet, a registry and other fixed costs. ”
To date the EU has only one specialized court: the Civil Service Tribunal. It costs less
to run and is more productive, per labour unit employed, than either the General
Court or the Court of Justice. The risk of inconsistent case law has not materialized
during the 10 years of the Civil Service Tribunal’s existence. The Treaties conceived
of specialized courts to deal with large numbers of similar type cases. Since the
number of trademark cases received by the General Court is increasing in absolute
and relative terms, they are ripe for such treatment. In any event, since it was repeat-
edly asserted that the only proposal under discussion was to double the number of
judges, it is reasonable to assume that there the alternative of creating specialized
courts was not examined.87
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states’ inability to agree on where additional 12 judges would come from?
GSC: “It is right that in early 2011 the President of the European Court of Justice made
a proposal to increase the number of judges by 12. It is also right that talks among
member states on the appointment method were inconclusive. However, since this
first proposal has been made the caseload increased significantly. Between 2010 and
2014, when the second proposal was made, the number of new cases increased by
43%. Due to this recent accelerated increase in the caseload an increase of the
number of judges by 12 would in any case have requested a new increase of the
number of judges by 2020 at the latest. The reform of the General Court as backed by
the Council offers a sustainable solution for current and foreseeable future
challenges.”
Between 2010 and 2015 the number of cases filed at the General Court increased by
29%. During the same period the number of cases ruled by the General Court
increased by 78%. In the same time the average time to deliver judgment has fallen
by 10 months, from 35 to 25. There is no basis for the assertion that the legislative
proposal is necessitated by an increase in the case load of the General Court or its
inability to handle that increase.
In 2011, the Court of Justice asked the Legislator for 12 new judges. In 2013, it
reduced its request to 9. There is now no objective basis to ask for 28, particularly
since the backlog has almost disappeared. The fact remains that, on 10 April 2014,
the Greek Presidency wrote to the Court of Justice stating that “…any solution which
would necessitate a choice between candidates for a number of posts which is lower
than the number of member states will most likely face the same difficulties as the
present proposal.” The true reason for doubling the membership of the General
Court thus seems to be obvious, although the GSC’s press release seems reluctant to
address it.88
